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 While the economic effects of immigration have recently become topics of debate 
in the public arena, the debate is a long-standing one in the economics literature. The 
labor market effects of immigration have long been of interest to economists. Whereas 
theory predicts large negative effects on the wages of competing native-born workers 
from influxes of immigrants in local markets, the bulk of papers in the literature find only 
small effects.  In this dissertation, I examine the impact of immigration on wages in the 
U.S. labor market.  In the first essay, I show that many forces in the labor market 
confound the identification of the effect of immigration on wages of native-born.  Using 
U.S. Census data, I find that the negative correlation between wages and immigration 
over 1960-2000 is driven entirely by low educated workers, and many demand-side 
trends over this period can equally explain the result.   
 
 
 The conclusion of Chapter 2 resolves the conflict between the majority of studies 
and recent ones that use a skill-based methodology to estimate the impact on wages of 
natives.  However, it does not resolve the divergence between theory’s predictions and 
empirical evidence.  In Chapter 3, I suggest how a reframing of the question of 
immigration’s labor market effects.  Namely, I present evidence that recent immigrants 
compete primarily with other immigrants, so that the strongest wage effects are found on 
immigrants rather than natives.  Immigrant competition with other immigrants is likely 
substantial due to the imperfect substitutability of immigrants for native workers, 
segmentation of the labor market by ethnicity and language, and skyrocketing levels of 
immigration.  In addition to estimating the effect of competition on the wages for all 
immigrants, I also analyze the effect on entry wages for new immigrants.  Previous 
literature has established that entry wages of new immigrants declined over 1970-1990 
and attributes this to declining unobserved “quality”. I find that up to forty percent of the 
declining entry wage can be explained by increasing competition among immigrants. 
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Chapter 1:  Immigration in the 20th century 
 
 By 1990 the number of immigrants in the U.S. reached an unprecedented 19.8 
million, and continued increasing over the following decade, reaching 31.1 million by 
2000.1  Both on a national scale and in local communities, the economic, social, and 
cultural effects of immigration are fiercely debated.  This debate, however, is not new in 
the public policy arena or among economists.  It arises in response to large waves of 
immigration, and the current wave is the second wave of its size in the 20th Century.  
 Understanding the effects of immigration on the economy, and in particular the 
labor market, can help economists distinguish between alternative views of how U.S. 
markets function.  Studies of immigration are thus of interest to economists for 
theoretical reasons.  However, it is perhaps immigration’s policy relevance that has 
attracted such a large number of studies.  Over the 20th century, immigration policy has 
changed enormously, going through periods of relatively tight limits and periods of 
liberal admissions policies, as well as changing the qualifications by which one merits 
admission.  Central to the policy debate is the effect of immigration on the wages of 
native-born Americans.  Research on immigration’s wage effects is vast and varied, and 
has the potential to inform many aspects of immigration policy.  It may shed light not 
only on the efficient level of immigrant admissions but also on how the background and 
skill mix of immigrants affects U.S. labor markets.  There are advocates on both sides 
arguing for and against liberalization of admission to the U.S., and evidence from 
economic research is adopted by each side to bolster their position.  Conflicting 
                                                 
1 U.S. Decennial Census. 
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conclusions from research on the impacts on native-born workers continue to fuel the 
debate. 
 In this dissertation, I examine the impact of immigration on wages in the U.S. 
labor market.  By offering ways in which we can refine the study of immigration’s effect, 
I explain some of the conflicting evidence in the literature and refine estimation of the 
true effect of immigration on the U.S. labor market.  This study is thus useful for framing 
the policy debate and also for informing theory.  Many researchers have searched for an 
effect of immigration on the wages of native workers, but until recently, have found little.  
This is surprising given the simple model of supply and demand in competitive labor 
markets, where an influx of workers due to immigration is predicted to reduce the wages 
of competing workers.  In Chapter 2, Seth Sanders and I show that many forces in the 
labor market may confound the identification of the national effect of immigration on 
wages of native-born.  Our findings help resolve the conflict between the majority of 
studies and recent ones that use a different methodology to estimate the impact on wages 
of natives.  It also suggests that the local area, rather than the nation as a whole, is the 
relevant unit of analysis in the study of immigration’s impacts.  However, the conclusions 
of Chapter 2 do not resolve the divergence between the model’s predictions and empirical 
evidence.  So in Chapter 3, I suggest how we might reframe the question of 
immigration’s labor market effects.  Namely, I present evidence that recent immigrants 
compete primarily with other immigrants, so that the strongest wage effects are found on 
immigrants rather than natives.  In the present chapter, I describe the policy environment 
and characteristics of immigrants in the U.S.  And in the final chapter, I discuss the 
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potential and the limitations for economic research on immigration’s effect to inform 
public policy. 
 
1.1 Immigration Waves of the 20th Century 
 Historically, economic research on immigration has followed major waves of 
immigration, driven largely by policy changes that have generated two major 
immigration flows in the 20th century.  Research on the economic effects of immigration 
date back at least to Paul Douglas’ study, published in 1930, of immigrants’ impact on 
wages in the manufacturing industry in the early 1900s.  And economic research on 
similar topics has blossomed again during the late 1900s immigration wave.  Although 
the absolute number of immigrants was lower in that early wave, the immigrant 
population relative to the native-born population was higher at that time than for the rest 
of the 20th century (Singer (2004)).  At 11.1% in 2000, the ratio of immigrants to the 
population finally reached the 1930 mark.  It is not surprising, then, that recent research 
on immigration in many ways mimics that of the very early 1900s.   
 The immigration wave of the late 19th and early 20th Century was driven largely 
by “pull” factors such as the rise of American industries that created new jobs and by 
“push” factors like economic and political crises in Europe.  In addition, large-scale 
migration was made possible by the spread of railroads across Europe (easing access to 
ports) and the introduction of faster and larger steamships for crossing the Atlantic (Wills 
(2005)).  By 1910, over 14% of the U.S. population was foreign-born.  In response to the 
early wave of immigration, policymakers essentially closed the door to immigration in 
 4
1924 with the first permanent limitation on immigration levels.2  The 1924 Act 
implemented national origin quotas that dramatically reduced the number of immigrants 
who could enter the country legally.  Quotas for each source country were set based on 
the percentage of immigrants from the same county in the U.S. as of 1920.  This system 
essentially excluded immigration from countries with no history of migration to the U.S.  
The policy also made a special exclusion for Japanese and other Asian immigrants.  Not 
only was the policy discriminatory towards national origin, but it was also discriminatory 
by sex by giving preference to skilled males.  The quota system dominated U.S. policy 
through the 1960s.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 started to reverse the 
discriminatory aspects of the original system, while upholding quotas.  It gave every 
country a minimum quota of 100, although set a ceiling of 2000 on most Asian countries.   
 The national origin quota system generated a significant dip in the stock and flow 
of immigrants in the U.S. between about 1924 and 1965.  In 1965, the quota system was 
abolished by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments.  This policy allocated 
visas on a first come, first served basis within a point system giving weight to relatives of 
U.S. citizens and permanent residents and to highly skilled persons.  The number of visas 
was limited to 290,000 per year starting in 1968 but grew to 675,000 per year starting in 
1990 through subsequent policy changes.3   
                                                 
2 The source of detailed information on U.S. immigration policy in this section is the Immigration Legal 
History documents from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services department.   
3 In 1965, numerical limits were set at 170,000 per year from the Eastern Hemisphere, with a limit of 
20,000 per country.  For the Western Hemisphere, the limit was set at 120,000 per year with no country-
specific limits.  In 1978, the hemisphere limits were combined into a worldwide limit of 290,000.  Then in 
1990, a major overhaul of immigration policy increased the worldwide limit to 675,000 per year.  
Numerical limits on immigration have some effect, but do not deter some migrants from entering the U.S. 
unlawfully.  This is evidenced in the amnesty and legalization granted to undocumented immigrants in the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  Also, the numerical limits do not apply to immigrants 
admitted on a temporary basis, for example under the H-1 and H-2 visa programs, or the special categories 
O, P, Q, and R which were created in 1990 for temporary workers. 
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 In the 20th Century, U.S. policy changed from liberal admittance to restrictive and 
back to liberal admittance.  In addition, economic factors induced migration in some 
periods, namely the beginning and end of the century, and deterred migration during the 
Great Depression beginning in 1929.   The political and economic factors thus created a 
U-shaped pattern for the proportion of immigrants in the U.S. over these 100 years.  
Figure 1-1 uses data from Singer (2004) to show both the stock and proportion of 
immigrants from 1900 to 2000.  As is standard in the economic literature, I define an 
immigrant as foreign-born and either naturalized or non-citizen.  The stock of immigrants 
in the U.S. tapers slowly for four decades after its peak in 1930 then rises dramatically in 
the last three decades.  Even the unprecedented level of immigrants in 2000, however, 
does not rival the concentration of immigrant in the early part of the century when 
viewed as a proportion of the native-born population.   
 The current wave of immigration has rekindled many of the same debates that 
took place during the first wave of immigration to the U.S.  What is the effect of this 
influx of immigrants on the labor market, the welfare system, the education system, and 
the culture of the U.S.?  Should U.S. policy limit the number or type of immigrants who 
are granted admission?  Unlike in the early wave of immigration, we now are better 
situated to answer some of these questions.  The availability and accessibility of rich data 
and the advancement of the tools of empirical economics provide the opportunity to 
evaluate some of these questions in detail.  When Paul Douglas was interested in 
understanding the effect of immigrants on wages in the early 1900s, he had to compile his 
own statistics and calculate correlations by hand, so he chose to examine only one 
industry.   Now, it is easy to obtain a nationally representative sample of individuals in 
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any given year with information on their family background, work information, and 
earnings.  By 2000, we also have nearly a forty-year history of immigration growth in the 
U.S.  This is a prime time to examine immigration’s effects.   
 As described above, in this study I focus on the wage effects of immigration.   
Thus from here forward, I will concentrate on the immigrant sub-population most often 
studied for its effects on the U.S. labor market. The sub-population of focus is immigrant 
males between ages 18 and 55, who are in the labor force and are not self-employed or in 
the military.  There are many interesting questions to ask about other immigrant sub-
populations.  For comparability with previous literature, however, working male 
immigrants are the focus of this analysis.  In the descriptions that follow, “immigrant” 
will refer to this subpopulation rather than to all immigrants in the U.S.  Following the 
previous figure, Figure 1-2 shows the growth in the male, working immigrant population 
from 1960 to 2000.  The male immigrant population as defined here composes a slightly 
larger proportion of all working males than the immigration to native population overall.  
By 2000, 14% of the male, working population was immigrant, more than tripling the 
ratio from 1960.  Not only is this rate of growth striking, but the compositional change of 
the immigrant population is also remarkable, which I describe in the next section.  
 
1.2 Composition of Immigrants in the U.S. 
 One layer of the debate on the effects of recent immigration considers the fact that 
the bulk of recent immigrants are different from native-born persons in observable 
demographic and economic ways.  The U.S. policy from 1924 to 1965 essentially 
maintained the composition of immigrants determined during the first wave of 
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immigration.  Hence, the immigrant pool until 1965 was primarily composed of Western 
Europeans.  As detailed above, policy changes from 1965 forward rescinded the national 
origin quotas and opened the doors to immigrants from countries with little history of 
migrating to the U.S.  Specifically, this opened the door to Asian and Eastern European 
immigrants.4  At the same time, declining economies in many of these countries and in 
Latin America induced migration from within.  Hence the composition of the immigrant 
stock in the U.S. began to change noticeably once the 1965 Amendments were enacted.   
 The large population of immigrants growing in the late 1900s was increasingly of 
Latin American and Asian origin, as shown in Table 1-1. By 2000, the majority of 
immigrants in the U.S. were from Central or South America, and nearly one-quarter were 
from Asia.  This is in stark contrast to the stock of immigrants in 1960, before the policy 
change, which was over sixty percent of European origin.   Also, Figure 1-2 shows that 
the flow of Latin American immigrants drives the increase in the overall stock of 
immigrants over the last two to three decades.  
 Because national origin is correlated with other demographic variables, such as 
education, age, and income, the changing composition of the immigrant stock adds 
another layer to the debate.  The average education level of immigrants is decreasing 
relative to native-born.  At the same time that wages of less-educated native-born workers 
are falling probably due to technological change and other factors, the number of 
immigrants arriving with low levels of education rises dramatically.  The simultaneity of 
                                                 
4 Although immigration from Latin America increased after the 1965 policy change, this was not entirely 
caused by the policy change itself.  Under the quota system, Western Hemisphere countries were not 
subject to country-specific quotas, only a quota for the Hemisphere.  So although the quota system 
restricted 1925-1965 immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere to the pre-1924 levels, it did not do so for 
Western Hemisphere countries.   
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these forces confounds identifying whether low-skilled immigration truly decreased the 
wage of competing workers.  This issue is considered carefully in Chapter 2.  
 To establish the education disparity between immigrants and native-born, Figure 
1-3 shows the percentage of immigrants relative to native-born in four major education 
categories: high school dropouts, high school graduates, those with some college, and 
college graduates.  If immigrants and native-born were equally represented in a given 
education group, then the ratio would equal one.  However, we observe that over the 
entire period 1970-2000, immigrants are more prevalent in the lowest educated group 
than are natives.  And this disparity has increased markedly over the three decades.  With 
such marked differences in human capital, the effects of immigration on labor market 
outcomes of native-born may not be as clear as expected from the predictions of a simple 
supply and demand theory.     
 
1.3 Changing Settlement Patterns 
 The labor market impact of immigrants is, in the short run at least, a local 
phenomenon.  There is debate about whether in the long run all native workers may be 
affected by immigrants who settle in one area of the country, and I will test this 
hypothesis in Chapter 2.  However, since local areas certainly experience the immediate 
effects of immigration, it is important to understand the geographic settlement patterns of 
immigrants.  There are many factors affecting where new immigrants decide to settle.  
Among the leading factors are: family ties or ties to ethnic groups, proximity to country 
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of origin, job information and opportunity, and favorable local labor market conditions.5  
Historically, immigrants have located in only a few cities, such as New York, Boston, 
Chicago, and San Francisco.  This was the case in the early 1900s and at the beginning of 
the second wave of immigration starting in 1968.  What is remarkable about the new 
immigration of the late 20th century is that immigrants have increasingly settled in cities 
that have traditionally received very few immigrants (Singer (2004)).  As the number of 
immigrants has grown, so has the dispersion of immigrants across the country.  Whereas 
in 1970 the geographic distribution of immigrants looked quite similar to that of the early 
1900s, by 2000 immigrants had fanned out to other cities that had never experienced a 
major influx of immigrants.  Chapter 3 considers one potential driver of this increasing 
dispersion, namely that increasing competition of immigrants with immigrants may 
induce settlement in new areas.  
 Figures 1-4 through 1-6 display the increasing dispersion of immigrants over 
1970-2000.  In each figure, a dot represents a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in the 
U.S.  An MSA is a county or group of counties with a major urban area at the center, as 
defined by the Census Bureau.  All 119 major MSAs are used in this analysis and are 
listed in Appendix A. In Figures 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6, the fraction of the population that was 
immigrant in 1970 is plotted on the x-axis and the fraction in the given year (1980, 1990, 
or 2000) is plotted on the y-axis.6  A 45-degree is given for reference.  We see that in 
1980 most of the MSAs are clustered around the 45-degree line, indicating that the 
proportion of immigrants by MSA was relatively similar in 1970 and 1980.  Also, in 
                                                 
5 Card and Lewis (2005) find that over 1990-2000, 75% of the variation immigrant inflows across cities is 
explained by settlement patterns of previous immigrants from the same source country and about 10% of 
the variation is explained by local labor market conditions.  
6 There is one outlier, Miami, which is not shown.  The fraction immigrant in 1990 and 2000 is outside of 
the scale chosen to best display the changes in immigrant population in the other 118 MSAs.  
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Figure 1-4 we observe that most MSAs are clustered towards zero, or at least below 5 
percent.  This reflects the fact that the growth in immigration over the 1970s was not 
substantial and that the dispersion of immigrants in 1980 was not that dissimilar from the 
dispersion in 1970.  Then in the next two figures, we find evidence of both increasing 
immigration and increasing dispersion.  By 2000, the fraction of immigrants in almost 
every MSA exceeds what it was in 1970.  As evidence of growing dispersion, we see that 
the MSAs are no longer clustered between zero and 5 percent.  By 2000, the increase in 
immigration affected almost all of the major MSAs.  Card and Lewis (2005) have 
documented that the diffusion of immigrants over the 1990s is due to the new location 
choice of recent immigrants rather than the relocation of older immigrants.  
 To analyze trends in immigrant location and growth more closely, I examine the 
ratio of immigrants to immigrants plus natives in each Metropolitan Statistical Area. The 
variation in fraction immigrant across MSA and across time is shown in Figures 1-7 and 
1-8.  Figure 1-7 plots the deciles of the distribution of fraction immigrant in each year.  It 
shows not only that high immigrant receiving MSAs experienced growth in immigration 
over the period, but even MSAs at the bottom of the distribution saw growth in the 
fraction immigrant.  In most MSAs the fraction immigrant increases monotonically over 
the period, so the deciles represent roughly the same set of MSAs in each year.  For 
precision, in Figure 1-8 I plot the average fraction immigrant within deciles defined by 
the 1965 distribution.  The same pattern is observed here.  The bulk of MSAs had very 
low fractions of immigrants in 1965, as seen by the fact that the average in each of the 
nine lowest deciles fell below 7% immigrant.  These low levels changed very little 
between 1965 and 1970, the period in which new immigration policy was enacted.  
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However, over the 1970s, immigrant populations grew, particularly in the top decile.  
Then over the 1980s and 1990s, more and more of the deciles are affected by the growth 
and dispersion of the immigrant population.  These new immigrants continued to flock to 
the original high-immigrant areas, but they also began settling in high numbers in places 
that traditionally received very few immigrants.  Appendix B further details which MSAs 
were affected by influxes of immigrants and in which year.   
 Most of the growth in immigrant population across and within MSAs is from the 
influx of immigrants from Latin America.  In Figure 1-9, as in the two preceding figures, 
I show the growth in fraction Latin American immigrant by MSA.  Using the 1965 
distribution of immigrants across MSAs, I calculate the average fraction within decile 
and show how that average changes over time.  In the traditionally and consistently high 
immigrant receiving MSAs, continued growth in immigrant population comes from 
growth in the number of Latin American immigrants.  For example in both Miami and 
Jersey City in 1970, only 6-7% of immigrants were from Latin America but by 2000, 
38% were.  Immigrants in Los Angeles are consistently of Latin American descent, but 
even more so over the period: from 43% in 1970 to 67% in 2000.   In Santa Barbara, an 
MSA which experienced high relative growth in immigrant population beginning in the 
1980s, the fraction of immigrants of Latin American stock went from 48% in 1980 at 
75% in 1990.  In Las Vegas, that fraction rose from 21% in 1980 to 65% in 2000.   
 
1.4 Economic Analysis of Immigration 
 As stated earlier, this dissertation focuses on the wage effects of immigration in 
the U.S.  To establish the trends in wages for workers in the U.S. labor market, Figures 1-
 12
10 and 1-11 presents the wage for employed native-born and immigrant men in 
metropolitan areas.7  Except for college graduates, the weekly wages of working men 
have been falling over 1970-2000.  The wages of immigrants are always lower than the 
wages of native-born except for high school dropouts in 2000.  The downward trend in 
wages of native-born workers has many sources, including perhaps the increase in 
immigration.  Parsing the immigration effect from other downwards trends over this 
period is one of the goals of Chapter 2.  In Chapter 3, I offer one explanation for the 
falling immigrant wage, namely increasing competition.  In addition, I show that 
increasing competition can partially explain the falling entry wage for new immigrants.   
 The decreasing wage upon arrival for immigrants is shown in Figure 1-12.  The 
line for immigrants in the U.S. 1-5 years, for example, plots the 1970 wage of immigrants 
who arrived between 1965-1969 and in 1980 plots the wage of immigrants who arrived 
between 1975-1979.  First note that by comparison to Figure 1-11, we see that immigrant 
wages upon entry to the U.S. are much lower than even the lowest educated immigrant 
(or native-born) wages. These entry wage trends are unadjusted for education, age, and 
U.S. labor market conditions.  As I document further in Chapter 3, even after controlling 
for observable human capital changes in immigrants across this period, the entry wage of 
immigrants declines as shown here.  I show that part of the decline in entry wage can be 
attributed to increasing competition in the labor market within immigrant groups.      
 Many economic studies exploit the growth in immigration during the last three 
decades of the 20th Century to answer interesting theoretical and policy questions about 
the labor market.  As previously noted, many of these studies make conflicting 
conclusions, and one goal of the present study is to offer explanation for some of this 
                                                 
7 Weekly wages are measured in 1999 dollars, deflated by the CPI-U index.  
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conflict.  I focus in particular on why studies that estimate the effect of immigration on 
wages of native-born workers find different results depending on the methodology.  In 
addition, I exploit the increasing dispersion of immigrants across the U.S., most notably 
over the 1990s.  This variation has not been harnessed for identification purposes in 
previous studies.  I also offer one explanation for immigrants locating in “new places”, 
namely the evidence of adverse wage effects for immigrant competition with other 




















 Reviewing a large set of papers that analyzed the effect of immigration on the 
wages of native workers in the U.S., the National Academy of Science Panel on 
Immigration (1997) concluded “there is only a small adverse impact of immigration on 
the wage and employment opportunities of competing native groups.”  Most of the papers 
correlate the immigrant share of a local labor market against the wages of native-born 
workers in that market.  The weak correlation between native-born wages and immigrant 
share of the labor market serves as evidence that immigrants have only a small adverse 
impact on native-born workers’ wages.   
This spatial variation estimation technique, however, is fraught with biases from a 
number of sources, including internal migration of workers.  Most authors acknowledge 
that migration within the U.S. arbitrages local wage differentials and can nullify the 
effects of immigration on wages as measured in spatial difference models.  If wages 
equilibrate across markets then regardless of the geographic distribution of immigrants, 
all areas of the country would have the same wages after workers migrate to exploit 
opportunities for higher earnings.  Borjas (2003) uses a novel approach to lessen the bias 
induced by internal migration; instead of geographic labor markets, he focuses on labor 
markets defined by skill.  Variation in wages and immigration within skill groups over 
time then identifies the effect of immigration on wages.  In contradiction to the NAS 
conclusion, Borjas finds a very large effect of immigration on native wages; his estimate 
                                                 
8 This chapter is coauthored with Seth Sanders.  
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is at least three- to four-times the size of the leading estimates.  For theoretical and policy 
reasons, it is important to understand whether, in fact, the impact of immigration has been 
vastly understated in previous studies as Borjas’ compelling result suggests.  
After carefully examining the evidence, we find that the Borjas (2003) results are 
driven largely by the earnings of one skill group during a 20-year period – high school 
dropouts between 1980 and 2000.   While we do not rule out immigration, any factor 
correlated with decreasing earnings of high school dropouts during these years could 
equally explain his results.  Many alternative reasons abound, including de-
industrialization, skill-biased technological change, and increasing negative selectivity of 
dropouts.  We look at time series evidence to distinguish immigration effects from these 
alternatives and find the pattern of shocks is largely inconsistent with the story that 
immigration drastically drives down native wages.  Rather, we find evidence that the 
measure of immigration used in Borjas (2003) may be a proxy for labor demand rather 
than labor supply.  Further, we isolate the role of immigration on the wages of native-
born by using data from the 1971-2001 Canadian Censuses.  Canada stands as an ideal 
comparison as immigration to Canada was considerably more skilled than immigration to 
the U.S., so trends in wages of the low skilled in Canada have less effect on the 
correlation between immigration and wages.  We find that the Canadian experience again 
suggests that the effect of immigration on the wages of the native-born is small. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
“Demand curves slope down.”  This is perhaps the best-understood principle in all 
of economics.  Economists believe this principle applies in a wide variety of contexts and 
 16
the demand for labor is no exception.  Just as with any other good, an increase in the 
supply of labor should, all other things equal, reduce labor’s equilibrium price.  
Immigration, which is an increase in the supply of labor to a country, should reduce the 
wages of all workers in the market.9  The magnitude of the wage effect is dependent upon 
the size of the supply shock, the elasticities of supply and demand, and upon 
simultaneous changes in labor demand.  To accurately measure the effect of immigration 
then, we must be able to isolate supply shocks from demand shocks. 
One set of complications to this textbook model rest on firm responses to 
immigration.  In a Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) model, where local areas are open rather than 
closed economies, firms face the choice of the amount of labor to employ relative to 
capital.  Local areas that receive large immigrant flows may substitute towards the 
production of labor-intensive goods.  In the extreme version of the model there is enough 
specialization in labor-intensive production (and enough trade across local markets) that 
there is no effect on wages either in the local labor market or the national labor market.  
Lewis (2003, 2005) and Hansen and Slaughter (2002) find some empirical support for 
this theory. 
Even when we can abstract from these complications, gathering evidence to 
support the simple “demand curves slope down” theory proves difficult.  If a country 
were made up of many small and closed economies then exogenous influxes of 
immigrants would allow us to test the basic textbook model using cross-sectional data.  
The relationship between changes in the number of immigrants and changes in wage 
across these small economies (e.g. cities) could identify the effect of immigration. 
Indeed, immigrants tend to cluster in a few cities, giving variation across cities in 
                                                 
9 Assuming perfect substitutability of workers, perfect mobility, and no shift in labor demand.  
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immigrant share of the local labor market.  Studies that use this variation to estimate the 
wage effects of immigration find both positive and negative effects, with most estimates 
close to zero (Goldin (1994), LaLonde and Topel (1991), Altonji and Card (1991)).   
A basic concern with these studies is that immigration to the U.S. and to particular 
U.S. cities is not exogenous but rather is related to local labor market conditions.10  If 
immigration decisions are indeed endogenous in this way, then estimates of the effect on 
wages using variation across cities are biased upward since immigrants choose to locate 
in markets with higher wages.  LaLonde and Topel use individual data in their analysis so 
that they can control for characteristics that may lead people to live in certain areas, 
potentially reducing the bias from simultaneity.  Goldin uses time series data and 
estimates the effect of a change in immigration density on the change in wage, which 
mitigates the endogeneity problem assuming that immigrants choose their location based 
on wages at the time of arrival, not projected wages.  Both of these analyses, however, 
still find relatively small effects:  a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction foreign-
born reduces wages by 1-1.6% in Goldin’s study and a 10% increase reduces wages by 
0.3% in LaLonde and Topel’s analysis.  Further, Altonji and Card (1991) use an 
instrumental variable strategy to correct for the endogeneity of immigrants’ locational 
decision.  Since immigrants tended to locate in areas where other immigrants already 
were living, Altonji and Card use the stock of immigrants in a local market as an 
instrument for the change in immigrants. They find larger negative effects of immigration 
(consistent with the belief that previous estimates were biased toward zero).  In their 
                                                 
10  Card (1990) uses the rare event of an exogenous immigration shock and finds no discernable effect on 
the labor market. Similarly, Kugler and Yuksel (2006) use the exogenous shock of immigrants due to 
Hurricane Mitch and find positive wage effects for higher educated native men and women and some 
negative employment effects on less-educated natives. 
 18
study, a 1 percentage point increase in the stock of immigrants reduces the wage of less-
skilled natives (that is, the most highly affected group) by an estimated 1.2%, which is in 
the range of Goldin’s result.   These studies, and many others, have used different 
techniques, data sources, time periods, and subgroups of the population, but still find 
results in the same range.   
A concern with these and many other immigration studies is that they must make 
the assumption that local labor markets are closed and native workers do not relocate in 
the face of worsening labor market conditions.  Ignoring this shortcoming biases 
estimates towards zero if migration of natives equalizes wages across cities.  However, 
the evidence on whether migration of natives is a major issue is mixed.  Kugler and 
Yuksel (2006) find no evidence of native outmigration in response to the influx of 
Central American immigrants caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1988.  Card (2001) models 
the local labor market outcomes and migration decisions jointly and finds that outflows 
of the native born are not sensitive to immigrant inflows, and that wages of low-skilled 
natives in immigrant “gateway” cities were reduced by only 1-3 percentage points in the 
1980s due to immigration.  Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) use a factor-proportions 
approach to investigate the effect of immigration and find the opposite results: natives 
migrate in the face of immigrant shocks, immigrant shocks do not have a clear effect on 
local area economies, and low-skilled natives are greatly harmed by immigration.11   
In addition to this inconsistent evidence on the outflow of natives from 
immigrant-receiving cities, one must recognize that outflows from cities are only half of 
the migration issue – immigration may slow population inflows to cities.  Studying this is 
                                                 
11 Note that the reliability of these conclusions is hampered by the fact that their estimates of immigration’s 
effect on proportion of labor by skill group are very sensitive to specification. 
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complicated by the fact that native-born workers tend to be attracted to the same robust 
labor markets as attract immigrants. There is no consensus on the degree to which 
immigration effects labor flows or on the bias in results that rely on local labor market 
variation in the immigrant share.  
Borjas (2003) circumvents these problems by using a novel kind of “closed 
market.”  He uses skill (education-experience) groups in the national labor market, rather 
than local areas, as his “closed market.”  This approach assumes that workers in different 
education-experience groups are highly imperfect substitutes, and thus compete in 
essentially independent labor markets and also that they do not “migrate” between 
groups.  Borjas cites the importance of experience found in the literature on human 
capital as evidence that workers are less than perfectly substitutable, even when they have 
the same level of education.  In addition, he compares the occupational distributions 
across skill groups and finds they are different enough to suggest that skill groups are not 
substitutable.  For the purposes of this study, we take his assumptions to hold.  Borjas’ 
idea of closed skill markets, then, allows him to exploit the differences between 
education-experience groups and the variation in immigrant shares within these groups 
nationally over time.  Using this strategy, Borjas estimates quite a large effect: a 10% 
increase in supply of workers causes a 3-4% decrease in the wage, more than double the 
largest effects estimated in previous literature.  In related work, Borjas (2004) estimates 
the effect of immigration by education level. He finds that among high school dropouts 
immigration over the 1980s and 1990s lowered the wages of high school dropouts by 
7.4%. He concludes “It is clear that Mexican immigration, which is predominantly low-
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skill, accounts for virtually the entire adverse impact of immigration on low-skill native 
workers.” 
The result in Borjas (2003) rests on the correlation between changes in immigrant 
share and changes in wage within education-experience groups over a 40-year period.  
Interpretation of his findings is complicated by the many factors theorized to effect 
within-group changes in wages over the period of his study, which have been 
documented in a wide body of literature.  Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), for example, 
document the within skill group increases in wage inequality, driven primarily by 
increasing returns to skill.  Many other papers have posited demand-side explanations for 
the trends in wages, citing skill-biased technological change and rapid de-
industrialization as driving forces.12  Alternative explanations for increasing wage 
inequality given in the literature include shifts in labor supply due to increased 
international trade, changes in the minimum wage, decreasing unionization rates, and, of 
course, immigration.  While the jury is still out on the relative importance of these 
factors, it is likely that many of these skill-based explanations have power in explaining 
the increasing wage inequality in the U.S.  
If changes in immigrant share within a skill group are correlated with changes in 
other factors that affect within-group wages, then the identification strategy in Borjas 
(2003) is problematic.  For example, if the immigrant share in low-skilled groups is 
increasing at the same time that the hypothesized skill-biased technological change has 
been driving down the wages of low-skilled groups, then using within skill group 
variation in wage to identify the effect of immigration is misleading.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
12 For example, Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Beaudry and Green 
(2003), Card and DiNardo (2002), Card and Lemieux (2001), and Katz and Murphy (1992). 
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if the immigrant share for a skill group is correlated with the wages of native-born 
workers prior to 1980, which is prior to the major onset of suspected skill-biased 
technological change and prior to the large reduction in industrial and unionized jobs, this 
is strong evidence that immigration, not other factors, is responsible.  Similarly, if after 
1980 variation in wages of the middle and upper skilled groups is correlated with changes 
in the immigrant share this would also be strong evidence that immigration is important.  
The first method to more fully understand the relationship between immigrant share and 
wages is to identify whether specific skill groups are disproportionately responsible for 
the negative correlation.  A second method is to evaluate a complete trend in immigration 
and wages, so that we can look specifically at the timing of immigration shocks and 
various labor demand and supply shocks.   
A final method to verify the immigrant share hypothesis is to test the model in a 
country where changes in the immigrant share by skill group were less correlated with 
other trends in wages.  Canada serves as a good point of comparison due to the many 
similarities it shares with the U.S. and also the differential trends in immigration and 
wages.  On a broad level, trends in immigration and wages have been much the same in 
the U.S. and Canada; both countries have experienced increasing wage inequality and 
changes in the national-origin composition of immigrants due largely to policy changes 
that reverse the preferential treatment of immigrants from Western and Northern Europe.  
However, looking more closely, there are important differences in these trends that are of 
great use to our study.  We will lay out these differences, first with regard to immigration 
and then with regard to wages.   
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Canadian immigration policy generally yields a more highly skilled immigrant 
pool than the U.S.  Though both nations adopted non-exclusionary policies toward Asian 
immigrants in the 1960s, other aims of the policies diverged from there.  The U.S. policy 
since the late 1960s has been generally aimed at family reunification, whereas the 
Canadian policy has been aimed at immigrant assimilation according to socioeconomic 
characteristics and responds to domestic economic conditions.  The Canadian policy of 
1967 constructs four classes of immigrants: (1) refugees, (2) close relatives or the “family 
class”, (3) independents, and (4) assisted, distant relatives.  Priority is given in this class 
order, and within the third and fourth classes, priority is given based on skill 
characteristics such as fluency in the language, age, education, and intended occupation.  
Because of the narrow definition of the family class, the policy in effect gave priority to 
those entering as independents, which was supposed to allow the country to fill gaps in 
the labor market.  In 1973, 70 percent of immigrants to Canada were part of the 
independent class and were thus assessed on skill.  Policies have gradually broadened the 
definition of the family class, so that in 1992 only 20 percent of the immigrants were of 
the independent class (Green (1999)).  Despite the slight weakening of the skill-based 
conditions for immigration to Canada, researchers do still find that Canadian policy has a 
significant effect on the skill composition of immigrants.  Borjas (1993) also shows that 
the policy in Canada attracts more skilled workers there than to the U.S.  Specifically, 
Canadian policy attracts immigrants from countries with higher mean skill rather than the 
more highly skilled immigrants from all countries, thus creating a different national-
origin composition in the two countries.   This is evident in a simple tabulation of the 
source country of the immigrant stock in each country over the period of this study, 
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presented in Table 2-1 for Canada and Table 1-1 for the U.S.  Both countries have 
experienced a decrease in the percentage of immigrants from Europe and an increase 
from Asia.  But the fraction of European immigrants in Canada is more than twice as 
large as that in the U.S. even at the end of the period.  And the fraction of South and 
Central American immigrants in the U.S. is over four times that in Canada in 1991.  In 
addition, Figure 2-1 shows the education of immigrants to Canada relative to Canadian-
born workers.  Comparing this figure to that for the U.S. (Figure 1-3) displays clearly that 
the relative education level of immigrants to Canada is much higher than for immigrants 
to the U.S.  Overall, the composition of immigrants in Canada is decreasingly skilled, 
though still more skilled than in the U.S.    
In summary, though Canada is similar to the U.S. in many ways, the more skilled 
immigrant flow to Canada stands in stark contrast to that of the U.S.  If the correlation 
between changes in immigration and wages in Canada is similar to that in the U.S., then 
we have evidence that the Borjas (2003) result is driven by immigration rather than other 
trends in wages.  
 
2.3 Data 
 The two primary data sources for this study are the 1960 – 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population and the 1971 – 2001 Canadian Census of Population. We use the U.S. Census 
data available from the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS).  In 1960 the 
Census Bureau released only a 1% sample of the U.S. population. However, beginning in 
1970, the Census Bureau released various 1% and 5% samples. These samples are all 
independent samples from the Decennial long form data. The samples vary on the 
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geographic detail released and in 1970 in a sub-set of the questions asked. But by 
combining samples within years it is possible to construct a 6% sample of the U.S. 
population for each census year between 1970 and 2000. 
 The Canadian Census of Population has been fielded every 5 years since 1956, 
although public use micro samples were first released in 1971.  We use all of the 
available Canadian microdata files that have the information needed for this study.13  The 
1996 file is a 2.8% sample, 1991 is a 3% sample, 1986 and 1981 are 2% samples, and 
1971 is a 1% sample of the Canadian population. 
 The key variables of interest are weekly wages (constructed from wage and salary 
income and weeks worked), education, and labor market experience (constructed from 
age). To the degree possible, we analyze the U.S. and Canadian data in a parallel fashion.  
Appendix C details the data issues with making the data sets comparable.  In following 
Borjas, our sample is subset in the following ways.  We use only males of age 18-64 who 
do not reside in group quarters and participate in the labor force.  All of our calculations 
of wages further subset this group to include the wage and salary income of those who 
are native (non-immigrant), not in school, who are not self-employed, and have worked 
greater than zero hours, greater than zero weeks, and made greater than zero earnings in 
the year prior to the survey.  An immigrant is defined as a person foreign-born and either 




                                                 
13 The 1976 Canadian Census microdata files do not collect earnings of individuals. 
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2.4 Methods 
We first replicate the Borjas (2003) results using 1960-2000 Census IPUMS data.  
Using a fixed-effects model we estimate the effect of the immigrant share on a labor 
market outcome (weekly wage, annual earnings, fraction working) by year-experience-
education group, accounting for the fixed effects from his 4 education groups, 8 
experience groups and 5 years of data: 
ijt ijt i j t i j i t j t ijtY X s x s x s xθ π π π ϕ= + + + + + + +                   (1.1) 
where i indicates schooling group, j indicates experience group, and t indicates decade.  Y 
is the logarithm of weekly wage, X is the immigrant share (ratio of immigrants to all 
persons in skill group), and s, x, and π are vectors of fixed effects for schooling group, 
experience group, and time, respectively.  θ is the main parameter of interest. The model 
accounts for the across education-experience group variation and time trends, so the 
within group variation over time is what identifies θ, that is, identifies a correlation in 
immigrant proportion and the average log weekly wage over time.   
There are several ways of judging the importance of an observation on the 
regression coefficient. In their important book, Regression Diagnostics: Identifying 
Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity, Belsley, Kuh & Welsch (1980) [hereafter 
BKW] suggest several methods for measuring the influence on parameter estimates of 
observations in multiple regression models.  The “DFBETAS” statistics are a scaled 
measure of the change in each of the l parameter estimates and are calculated by deleting 
the kth observation:  















=                            (1.2) 
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where the error variance is estimated by ( )( )2ks without the kth observation, ( ) 1' llX X −   is 
the (l,l)th element of the standard regressor matrix ( ) 1'X X − .  In general, large values of 
DFBETAS indicate observations that are influential in estimating a given parameter. 
BKW recommend a size-adjusted cutoff of 2 n  to indicate an influential observation.  
Using the BKW suggested cutoff, we can then isolate observations having the largest 
influence on the initial regression.   
 
2.5 Replication and Analysis of Competing Explanations 
2.5.1 Replication and Examination of Influential Observations 
We now reconstruct the Borjas (2003) analysis using the 1960-2000 IPUMS.  
Table 2-2 shows that we are able to replicate the results quite closely.14  We estimate that 
for a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction immigrant, there is a corresponding 
5.38% decrease in wage of native workers in the same education-experience cell.  Borjas 
(2003) estimated this relationship at 5.46%.  When the cells are weighted by the number 
of immigrants and natives in a cell, the estimates are less similar, but not strikingly. 
Before examining what drives the relationship given in Table 2-2, we simply present a 
scatter plot of the demeaned decadal changes in wage and percentage foreign born in the 
unweighted model.15  Figure 2-2 also labels the 10 observations with the largest values of 
                                                 
14 There are three potential sources of differences in our estimates. First, we use the full 6% samples for 
1970-2000. Because of the large size of the IPUMS we suspect this is not a major cause of the divergent 
results. Second, we are unclear on some of the subsetting rules Borjas used. For example, it is unclear how 
Borjas deals with the fact that no citizenship status (to define immigrant) is available in 1960, and how he 
identifies persons in school in the March 2000 CPS data.  Finally, Borjas uses CPS data for 2000 and we 
use Census 2000 since it is now available. 
   
15 This plot essentially maps the first-difference version of the fixed effects model we use.  First difference 
models are equivalent to fixed effects, in the absence of measurement (and specification) error.  Since the 
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DFBETA.  Almost without exception, these are high school dropouts from either 1990 or 
2000, and these experienced a decrease in log weekly wages.  This is our first source of 
evidence that this group will be important in understanding the results in Table 2-2. 
To more formally test this we rank the year-education-experience cells according 
to the DFBETA statistic and present those that exceed the BKW suggested cutoff.16  
Table 2-3 lists the nineteen observations that exceed this level, twelve of which are high 
school dropouts. Also, twelve of the top influential observations are from the 1980-2000 
period.  
 We next examine the influence of cells by education and year groups, to give a 
fuller picture than simply looking at the individual year-education-experience cells that 
exceed the DFBETA cutoff.  We calculate the fraction that each year-education group of 
cells contributes to the total weight on the regression estimate coming from the right-
hand side variable of interest.  In a simple linear two-variable regression, the weight of 
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experience, and t indexes year.  The measure we will use, 'ijtw , is not a direct 
                                                                                                                                                 
fixed effects model is identified off of changes within education-experience cells across time, we can see 
why the two versions of the model must be essentially equivalent.  
16 The BKW suggested cutoff is 0.158.  And Table 3 reports results for the unweighted regression, as our 
analysis matches Borjas (2003) most closely for the unweighted specification. 
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decomposition from the coefficient estimate, since we are using a fixed effects model, but 
'ijtw  does give a rough idea of the influence coming from the immigrant supply share: 
 
( )












                                              (1.3) 
 
This influence weight is calculated for every year-education-experience cell and then 
summarized across year-education groups. 
Table 2-4 summarizes these approximate regression weights 'ijtw  by year and 
education.  When we look at which year and education cells influence the regression the 
most, we find that high school dropouts account for approximately 51% of the influence 
on the regression from the right-hand side variable, shown in Table 2-4.  Specifically, 
high school dropouts in 1990 and 2000 account for over 40% of the influence.   
 Just as the influence of an observation can be analyzed by dropping it and re-
estimating the regression, we look at the effect of dropping each group of the education-
year cells (that is, across experience) on the estimated impact of the immigrant share on 
the wages of the native born.  Table 2-5 shows that eliminating any education-year group 
except for high school dropouts had little effect on the estimated coefficients; for 
example, eliminating the high school graduate-1960 cell reduces the estimated coefficient 
from –0.434 to –0.457.  When all high school dropouts are eliminated the estimated 
regression coefficient becomes positive and is no longer statistically significantly 
different than zero.  Likewise, when high school dropouts in 1990 and 2000 are 
eliminated from the regression, the coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant 
(the estimated coefficient is -0.378 with standard error of 0.377).  Put simply, the falling 
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wages of high school dropouts over the period is entirely responsible for the measured 
negative correlation between the immigrant share and the wages of the native-born. 
 The results in Tables 2-4 and 2-5 lead us to the conclusion that high school 
dropouts between 1980 and 2000 are driving the entire result.  Many hypotheses 
including the hypothesis of skill biased technological change would predict that exactly 
these cells would experience the largest downward trend in wages.   
 
2.5.2 Time Trend Results 
 We believe that factors other than immigration may be behind the correlation 
between immigrant share and native wages based on the fact that low-skilled groups in 
1980-2000 are entirely responsible for the measured negative correlation. That is, 
immigration of other skill groups between 1980 and 2000 do not seem to be correlated 
with native-born wages and immigration of any skill group is uncorrelated with native-
born wages prior to 1980. This analysis relied on data from five points in time (the 
decennial censuses).  We now look more closely at what happened between these points.  
Consistent with the differences between wages and immigrant share across decade, we 
find that in general the wages of high school dropouts fell while the fraction of 
immigrants rose. However, there is little evidence that year-to-year variation in 
immigrant share is correlated with year-to-year changes in wages and there are several 
periods over the 1980s and 1990s where immigrant share and wages are positively 
correlated. 
 We use data from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Program 
Participation (SIPP) to analyze the inter-census periods.  Questions regarding 
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immigration were asked in the March supplements in 1994-2001 and in the June 
supplements in 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994-2001.  Not only is current citizenship and 
nativity available, but also the year of immigration.  To measure immigration share in the 
years not listed above, we use the year of immigration variable from the nearest survey.  
For example, our CPS measure of the immigrant stock in 1984 is estimated as the stock 
of immigrants in 1986 less those who in the June 1986 supplement indicated they 
immigrated between 1984 and 1986.  We believe this is a more reliable technique than to, 
for instance, use the year of immigration variable from the 1991 or 1994 survey, since 
fewer immigrants will have emigrated or died as of 1986.  The year of immigration 
variable is coded in intervals of varying length, so we cannot construct the immigrant 
stock for every year between 1974 and 2001. The SIPP data, however, recorded 
information on immigrant status since its inception in 1984. While we are unable to 
construct the immigrant stock for every year, we believe we have enough information to 
give a clear picture of the trend in immigration.  To construct the trend of wages, we use 
men of age 18-64 who are employed, not in school, not self-employed, with positive 
earnings, hours, and weeks worked, just as we did in the previous section.  Unlike before, 
we use the wages of all workers, not just native workers because we cannot distinguish 
natives from immigrants in all years.  Where we can distinguish the two, we find that 
including or excluding immigrants does not affect the trend.  
 The sharpest downward trends in real wages experienced by low-skilled groups 
occurred in the early 1980s and then again in the early 1990s.  Figure 2-3 shows this by 
focusing on wages of high school dropouts.  The timing of these drops in wages is 
consistent with evidence offered on the hypotheses of de-industrialization and skill-
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biased technological change.  When we then compare the trend in wages to the trend in 
immigrant share, we first note how the changes between 1980, 1990, and 2000 would 
predict the negative relationship between immigration and wages estimated in Table 2-2.  
Between 1980 and 1990, Figure 2-3 shows a large decrease in wages and a modest 
increase in immigration.  Then between 1990 and 2000, we see a more modest decrease 
in wage and a large increase in immigration.  So estimation off of these three points 
would clearly give a negative correlation in wages and immigration.  However, Figure 2-
3 shows that there is much more going on than the three points would suggest.  Between 
1979 and 1983 as wages dropped precipitously, immigration was almost flat.  Then as 
immigration began to rise from about 1983 to 1988, wages were almost flat.  Finally, 
beginning around 1994, the immigrant share rose as the wages of high school dropouts 
rose. This pattern is the opposite of what the simple supply and demand theory, and 
indeed the Borjas (2003) result, would suggest.  During the critical post-1980 period it is 
only the period between 1989 and 1994 where immigration rose while wages fell.  
To summarize, we find that year-to-year changes in the share of immigrants are 
not especially strongly correlated with the change in the wages of high school dropouts 
for much of the time period between 1980 and 2000. The largest decline in wages occurs 
prior to the largest increases in the immigrant stock, occurring during the period where 
the effects of skill-biased technological change, negative selectivity in education, and de-
industrialization are hypothesized to be important. However, for one period of time, 
between 1989 and 1994 there appears to be large increases in the immigrant share 
coincident with large declines in the wages of high school dropouts. 
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2.5.3 Testing for Compositional Changes in Immigrant Share 
 The model in this paper correlates the immigrant share with the average log wage 
of an experience-education group, imposing a restriction on how changes in the native 
born workers affect wages relative to the affect of foreign-born workers.  The observed 
negative correlation between wages and the immigrant share variable could be the result 
of changes in the number of natives rather than the number of immigrants.  This 
distinction is important, given the marked changes in education attainment in the U.S. 
over this period of study, which likely proxies for changes in labor demand.  Between 
1960 and 2000 the fraction of native-born workers that were high-school dropouts 
decreased enormously, as shown in Table 2-6. If high-school dropouts were more 
negatively selected, as their numbers dwindled the remainder may have had lower 
unobserved human capital and lower wages.  If this is true then changes in the number of 
native born in a cell could affect wages directly through educational selection.  It would 
increase confidence in the Borjas (2003) result if at least part of the negative correlation 
between wages and the immigrant share was driven by the stock of immigrants.   
To test this we estimate the model  
1 2ijt ijt ijt i j t i j i t j t ijtY I N s x s x s xθ θ π π π ϕ+= + + + + + + +  .                (1.4) 
Equation 1.4 decomposes the immigrant share, ijtijt
ijt ijt
IX I N= + , into the number of 
immigrants and natives, I and N, respectively.  It allows us to test whether rises in the 
number of immigrants or declines in the number of native-born are correlated with a fall 
in the wages of the native born. It also allows us to test the model restriction that 
( )( ) ( )( )yI yNy I I y y N N yε ε= ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ = −  in equation (1.1). 
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Using the full Census dataset, we find that an increase in the number of 
immigrants in a cell has a negative but small and statistically insignificant effect on 
native wages whereas an increase in the number of natives has a positive effect on wages 
(Table 2-7). This casts some doubt on making a strong negative interpretation of the 
correlation between the immigrant share and wages as estimated in Section 2.5.1. 
 To test the restriction implicit in equation 1.1, the null hypothesis is yI yNε ε= −  
which in our notation simplifies to 2 1 I
N
θ θ= ∗  where I and N are evaluated at the mean.  
This test gives an F-statistic of 13.66, leading to a rejection of the null.  These results 
indicate that changes in the native population may actually be more responsible for the 
negative correlation than influxes of immigrants.  Because high school dropouts have so 
much influence on the regression line, the timing of the native-born workforce being 
decreasingly likely to be high school dropouts during the period in which wages for this 
group were deteriorating appears to be a large part of the underlying measured correlation 
between immigrant share and native-born wages. The fact that number of natives in skill 
cells is positively correlated with wages is consistent with the idea that immigrant share 
proxies for labor demand. 
 
2.6 Results from Analysis of Canadian Data 
Given the evidence to this point that many factors are behind the correlation 
between immigrant share and native wages within skill groups, we now turn to Canadian 
data for a further test.   Low-skilled Canadians in the 1980s and 1990s experienced much 
smaller increases in wage inequality, so this is a natural point of comparison to the U.S. 
experience, where our evidence shows that skill-related trends in wages in the U.S. drive 
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the correlation between immigrant share and wages.  Also, immigrant flows to Canada 
tend to be more highly skilled, so the negative selectivity of low-skilled workers that may 
drive part of the story in the U.S. should be less of a factor in Canada.  If the Borjas 
(2003) result is robust, that is, if increases in immigration truly drive the observed 
decreases in wages within skill group, then it should be the case that immigration to 
Canada has a negative effect on the wages of native Canadians even though the 
immigrant skill composition and the trends in wages are quite different.   
First we run the standard fixed effects regression using the Canadian Census data: 
                 c c i j t i j i t j t ijtijt ijtY X s x s x s xα π π π ϕ= + + + + + + +                   (1.5) 
We find that the correlation between immigrant share and native wages by cell in Canada 
is much less strong than in the U.S.  Though negative, the correlation is statistically 
insignificant, as given in Table 2-8.  We find very dissimilar results compared to the U.S. 
regressions, suggesting that in the absence of the U.S. trends in immigration and wages, 
the correlation between immigrant share and native wages virtually disappears.  
 Skill-based explanations for this correlation would suggest low-skilled workers in 
the 1980s and 1990s are the most influential, though we would expect the explanation to 
have less power in the Canadian data than in the U.S.  Indeed, this explanation seems to 
have no power; the skill groups affected by skill-biased technological change and other 
demand-side trends in wages have no more influence on the regression line than any 
other groups.  Table 2-9 shows the percentage of the weights, 'ijtw  , that each education-
year group contributes.  With the exception of high school graduates in 1971, all year-
education cells have approximately equal weight on the regression line. 
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Since changes in wage and immigration within skill groups in Canada have been 
less pronounced than in the United States, perhaps the variation identifying the 
relationship between changes in wage and immigration are inadequate.  Canada has not 
experienced the same level of growth in immigration as the U.S.  In the 1970s, 
immigration to the U.S. neared the high levels of the early 1900s but immigration to 
Canada remained virtually the same (Greenwood and McDowell (1991)).  This concerns 
us to the extent that variation in immigrant share is very low in Canada and very high in 
the U.S.   However, Figure 2-4 shows that because the model takes account of time trends 
(by demeaning), the variation in both variables is much the same in Canada as in the U.S.  
This evidence suggests that the statistically insignificant results here are not caused by a 
lack of sufficient variation.   
Although we see a lot of variation in wages and immigrant share by year-
education-experience cell in Canada, a concern remains.  Because the Canadian Census 
samples are smaller than the U.S. samples in all years, in some year-education-experience 
cells in Canada there are a markedly low number of observations relative to the U.S. cell 
size.  This raises the concern that measurement error could be biasing the results in 
Tables 2-8 and 2-9.  In particular, high education, high experience cells in 1971 have 
fewer than 100 observations per cell.17  We take two strategies to account for this 
potential measurement error.  First, we look only at high school dropouts, a group that 
has an ample number of observations in all years and both in the U.S. and Canada.  This 
is also the group we expect to be most affected by influxes of immigrants.  Table 2-10 
shows that while the negative correlation between wages and immigration is amplified 
                                                 
17 The full table of cell sizes in Canada and the U.S. can be found in Appendix D. 
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for high school dropouts in the U.S., the zero correlation in Canada remains.  Our results 
stand up within the group of high school dropouts, where measurement error is highly 
unlikely to be a problem.  
 As a second method to address measurement error concerns, we collapse small 
year-education-experience cells together and re-run the model.  Because only cells with 
high experience have fewer than 100 observations, we group the three highest experience 
cells together into a fifteen-year experience cell.  This gives us five five-year experience 
cells (from one year to twenty-five) and a sixth cell covering twenty-six to forty years of 
experience.  Comparing the results using the eight original experience categories and our 
six categories shows very little change.  The results in Table 2-11 suggest that either there 
is no measurement error or if there is measurement error, it occurs in cells with even 
more than 100 immigrants, which is highly unlikely.   
 We should consider further problems with using Canada as a point of comparison.   
Institutional differences between the countries may play a role.  DiNardo and Lemieux 
(1997) concluded that two-thirds of the differential increase in wage inequality between 
the U.S. and Canada is explained by differences in unionization and the minimum wage.  
Gottschalk (1993) also claims that the differential growth in public transfers accounts for 
the differential increase in wage inequality.  Similarly, employment patterns may play a 
role since young low-skilled Canadians were more likely to be out of work than their 
U.S. counterparts in the 1980s (Bowlus (1998)) and when researchers include part-time 
workers in the analysis of Canadian wage inequality, that inequality increases (Gottschalk 
and Joyce (1992)).  These factors make the comparison of U.S. and Canadian labor 
market affects an imperfect natural experiment when looking specifically at trends in 
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wages.  In addition, broader differences exist such as the progressivity of the tax rate and 
availability of public health insurance.  However, Canada is more similar to the U.S. than 
almost any other country and many others have used the two as points of comparison.   
The negative correlation between wages and immigrant share does not exist in the 
Canadian data.  Unlike the U.S., skill groups that have the most influence on the 
regression do not coincide with those most affected by skill-based explanations for trends 
in wages.   This is further evidence that the strong negative result in the U.S. is not 
measuring the pure effect of immigration. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
 We have shown that the U.S. results on the correlation between wages and 
immigration are driven by low skilled cells and are subject to demand side factors.  In 
particular, as section 2.5.3 shows, the native component of the key variable “immigrant 
share” is the driving force.  We expect that the number of natives in skill cells is 
correlated with wages thru many factors other than labor supply.  For example, increasing 
demand for skilled labor drives up the wage and drives workers toward higher levels of 
educational attainment.  The number of natives in high skilled groups is positively 
correlated with wages.  This trend works in the other way as well, with workers “left 
behind” in low skilled groups being negatively selected, at the same time that wages for 
low skilled workers decrease due to falling demand.  We chose a simple model for 
education selection and found that it could explain the entire downward trend in wages of 
high school dropouts.  Under the model that those remaining in the lowest educated 
category are negatively selected, and assuming that translates into lower wages, the fixed 
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effects regression presented earlier would tend to overestimate the negative effect of 
immigration on wages of natives. We construct a counterfactual wage for high school 
dropouts in 1960-1990 representing what the wage would have been if the most 
successful dropouts would have gotten a high school degree had they been of the same 
age in 2000.  We find that under the counterfactual model, wages of dropouts would have 
been rising rather than falling were it not for education selection.18  Thus negative 
selectivity of high school dropouts is a potential competing explanation for the observed 
negative correlation between immigration and wages within skill groups.  A simple 
model for the negative selectivity of low educated, native workers reveals that were it not 
for trends towards more education, the wages of this group may have actually increased 
over the period of study.   
 Behind the national labor market hypothesis is the idea that markets are 
integrated.  From this we can make two predictions.  First, no matter where an immigrant 
arrives in the U.S., the effect on native-born wages should be the same across all regions 
of the U.S.  Second, in any given area of the country, the wage in each region is a 
function of immigration shocks in all other regions.  Using a variety of divisions of the 
U.S. into regions and decomposing the national shock into regional shocks, we test these 
two predictions and strongly reject both.  We find that the immigrant shares across 
regions have very different correlations (or none) with national wages.  And we find that 
only the immigrant share in the West has a statistically significant impact on wages in all 
other regions, even though other areas of the country have experienced increasing shares 
of immigrants.19  This casts doubt on an analysis which starts by assuming that the U.S. 
                                                 
18 See Appendix E. 
19 See Appendix F. 
 39
labor market is truly national.  As low skilled workers are generally found to be less 
mobile, it may be more likely that the national labor market hypothesis is valid for only 




Sorting out why the share of immigrants in a skill group is negatively correlated 
with the wages of native born in that group is difficult.  While we have no single piece of 
evidence, we believe that the preponderance of the evidence presented here suggests that 
this negative correlation is not reflecting the national impact of immigration on the wages 
of native-born workers.  We find that high school dropouts between 1980 and 2000 
entirely drive the negative correlation.  While it may be that immigration depressed the 
wages of this group, it would be premature, at best, to conclude this.  First, this group 
during this time period was likely negatively affected by several other factors including 
skill-biased technological change, negative selectivity in education, and de-
industrialization.  Second, the year-to-year changes in the immigrant share for this group 
are not especially correlated with the year-to-year changes in wages and during some 
time periods they are actually positively correlated.  This is some evidence that trends in 
native low skilled workers other than immigration are very important.  Further, our 
analysis of compositional changes in the immigrant share statistic showed that indeed 
across all skill groups, the number of natives rather than the number of immigrants 
appears to be largely responsible for the correlation between immigrant share and wages. 
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When we look at Canada, where immigration was more skilled, we find no evidence of a 
negative correlation between immigrant share and wages at the national level.   
One possible resolution is that the immigrant share does not effect wages of more 
skilled groups but does effect the wages of high school dropouts.  This would explain 
why in Canada the immigrant share is uncorrelated with the wages of native Canadians 
and why in the U.S. it is also uncorrelated among skill groups with a high school level 
education or greater.  But if this is true, one wonders why the estimates here are so much 
larger than estimates in the literature that rely on geographic variation in the immigrant 
share as high school dropouts are the least geographically mobile group in the U.S.  It is 
perhaps for this group where the estimates in the literature are most likely to hold. 
 The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the identification of 
immigration’s wage effects at a national level within skill groups is confounded by the 
skill bias in both immigration and wage trends over 1960-2000.  Although the national-
level identification strategy may minimize bias from native migration in studies using 
local-level variation, recent evidence suggests this bias is negligible.20  Hence, compared 
to the spatial variation methodology, the drawbacks from the national-level identification 
strategy likely outweigh the gains.  In addition, other evidence on immigration’s effects 
suggests that the local area is the relevant unit of study.  Cortes (2006) finds that prices of 
non-tradeable goods (which are produced overwhelmingly by immigrant labor) are 
statistically significantly lower in cities with more immigrants.  Lewis (2006) finds local 
industries respond to immigration influxes by altering the choice of production technique.  
These studies indicate that large local differences can persist and that the local area is the 
relevant unit of analysis in the study of immigration’s impacts.    
                                                 
20 Kugler and Yuksel (2006) and Card (2001).   
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Chapter 3:  The Quantity and Quality of New Immigrants to 
the U.S. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 Chapter 2 finds that immigrants have little effect on the wages of native-born, 
leaving unanswered the question of where are the labor market effects of immigration.  In 
this chapter I hypothesize that the primary labor market effects of immigration should be 
on immigrants, given labor market segmentation and the fact that immigrants and natives 
are not perfectly substitutable for each other.  I find that the concentration of immigrants 
in a local area has a large, negative effect on the wages of immigrants.  Within ethnic or 
language groups, this correlation is even stronger.  In addition to examining how the 
growing number of immigrants affects the wages of immigrants, the methodology in this 
chapter can also shed light on previous results in the literature indicating that the quality 
of immigrants has been declining over the past few decades.  I find that the increasing 
concentration of immigrants can explain up to forty percent of the declining entry wage 
of new immigrants between 1970 and 1990, which has otherwise been attributed to 
declining unobserved “cohort quality”.  
 As detailed in Chapter 2, the vast immigration literature in general identifies very 
small negative effects, if any, of immigration on the wages of native workers.  This is in 
contrast to basic supply and demand theory, which predicts a wage response to such large 
shifts in the supply of workers in geographically-defined labor markets.  However, there 
are many reasons why this simple theory may not capture the true functioning of labor 
markets.  First, if immigrants and native-born workers are not perfectly substitutable for 
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each other, or if they are actually complements for each other, then the effect of new 
immigrants entering the labor market may decrease the wage of native-workers by a 
smaller than expected amount, or may even increase it.  Indeed, there is growing 
evidence that even within a skill group, immigrants are not closely substitutable with 
natives for many reasons, including language and U.S.-specific human capital (LaLonde 
and Topel (1991), Ottaviano and Peri (2006)).  Second, segregation may preclude 
immigrants from competing with natives in the labor market.  Recent studies show that 
the labor market and even individual firms are segregated by language and ethnicity 
(Hellerstein and Neumark (2003)).  Last, immigrants are highly concentrated in a 
relatively few local labor markets, though less and less so in the most recent decades.  For 
example, it is highly unlikely that immigrants arriving in New York City have a direct, 
strong effect on the wages of a native-born worker in Pittsburgh.  Given these three 
pieces of information, upon which I expand further below, I hypothesize that immigrants 
suffer the main adverse wage effects from increased immigration.  This is the “quantity” 
side of the analysis. 
 The second focus of this chapter is to analyze the “quality” results in the 
literature.  Research finds the starting wage of new immigrants decreased with successive 
arrival cohorts between 1970 and 1990 (Borjas (1985, 1995)).  Despite controlling for 
observable skill differences and labor market conditions, the declining entry wage 
persists.  Thus the wage differential between cohorts is attributed to declining unobserved 
immigrant “quality”.  However, if successive immigrant cohorts face ever-increasing 
levels of competition, then the declining entry wage may result from increasing 
competition rather than declining quality.  I test this hypothesis by examining whether 
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immigrant concentration in local labor markets has power in explaining the difference in 
entry wages for new immigrant cohorts between 1970 and 2000.   
 I test the quantity and quality hypotheses using Census Public Use Microdata 
from 1970-2000.  The empirical strategy correlates immigrant wages, either individually 
or as an arrival cohort, with the concentration of immigrants in the local area.  The 
identifying variation comes from the growth of immigration over 1970-2000 and the 
increasing geographic dispersion of immigrants.  To interpret the correlation as causal, 
the assumption is that immigrant concentration is not endogenous with immigrant wages.  
Two factors, working in opposite directions, may violate this assumption and bias the 
estimated effect of immigrant concentration on the wages of immigrants.  I will discuss 
these in detail in section 3.3.  Generally, the first is the problem of endogenous location 
decision which I handle by estimating the effects off of changes in wages rather than 
levels.  Second, although the geographic dispersion of immigrants provides identifying 
variation, it may also bias the estimated effects since immigrants are increasingly likely 
to living in local areas with lower average wages.  Thus, the average wage of new 
immigrants over time may appear to decrease with immigrant concentration, not because 
of a causal relationship but because over time immigrants are more likely to live in cities 
with lower wages.  I use native wages to control for this potential source of bias, so that 
all estimated effects on immigrant wages are measured relative to native-born in the 
locality. 
 I find that immigrant concentration has a statistically significant, negative effect 
on the wages of immigrants relative to natives.  For a ten percentage point increase in the 
fraction of immigrants in a metropolitan area, I estimate a 2.7 percent decrease in wages 
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of immigrants.  This effect is large relative to previous studies.  I find these effects to be 
stronger within sub-populations predicted to be particularly subject to labor market 
segmentation.  In particular, I find that for the same increase in fraction of immigrants, 
there is 5.9 percent decrease in the wages of immigrants not fluent in English.  Similarly, 
for a ten percentage point increase in the fraction of immigrants from Latin America in a 
local area, I estimate a 3.2 percent decrease in wages of immigrants from Latin America.  
These estimates are consistent with evidence of labor market segmentation by language 
and ethnicity.  
 I also find that immigrant concentration can explain a relatively large portion of 
the decline in entry wage of new immigrants relative to natives between 1970 and 1990.  
Up to forty percent of the decline is explained by immigrant concentration.  Thus I 
conclude that immigrant competition with immigrants is a powerful factor in 
understanding not just the level of immigrant wages, but also the changes in wages of 
new immigrants over time.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 As reviewed in the previous chapter, the bulk of the literature on wage effects of 
immigration finds little adverse effect of immigration on wages of natives, despite strong 
theoretical predictions to the contrary.  Using a different source of variation than most 
papers in the literature, Borjas (2003) finds a much larger negative impact.  Borjas (2003) 
attempts to circumvent some of the problems in the spatial variation identification 
method by analyzing immigration within skill markets rather than geographic markets.  
However, as the previous chapter shows, the Borjas (2003) methodology confounds the 
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impact of immigration with other downward pressures on wages within skill groups over 
the period of study.  Thus the empirical evidence to-date fails to confirm the predictions 
from a simple supply and demand model where natives and immigrants substitute for 
each other in the labor market.  In addition, the evidence from Chapter 2, Cortes (2006) 
and Lewis (2006) indicate that the local area is the relevant unit of study, as explained in 
the previous chapter.   
 There is growing evidence on the imperfect substitutability of immigrants and 
natives in production.  Chapter 1 describes the education and age differences between 
immigrants and natives.  The imperfect substitutability of workers across skill groups is 
commonly accepted (and is exploited in Borjas (2003)).  However, even within a skill 
group immigrants and natives may be poor substitutes. Differences in language, culture-
specific human capital, institutional knowledge, and perhaps even preferences are a few 
examples.  Some of these differences diminish as immigrants assimilate into the U.S. 
labor market.  Imperfect transferability of human capital acquired abroad predicts that 
starting wages of immigrants will be lower than wages of natives with similar skill but 
that the growth rate is higher than for natives.  These predictions have been confirmed 
empirically in numerous studies, beginning with Chiswick (1978).  This need for 
assimilation is one source of imperfect substitutability of immigrants for natives, and 
LaLonde and Topel (1991) estimate the elasticities of substitution.  They find that new 
immigrants are less substitutable for natives and for immigrants who have been in the 
U.S. a longer time.  They also find that these elasticities diminish with older and older 
arrival cohorts.  
 46
 Even after assimilating, there remain differences between immigrants and natives 
that can generate less then perfect substitutability.  Two recent studies, Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006) and Cortes (2006), find empirical evidence of the imperfect substitutability of 
immigrants and natives.  Ottaviano and Peri (2006) estimate elasticities of substitution 
within education-experience groups and Cortes (2006) estimates the elasticity for high 
school dropouts only.  Difference in language ability, for example, can generate this 
imperfect substitutability.21  The more language ability matters in a particular industry or 
occupation, the less substitutable are immigrants for natives.  Thus the expected effect of 
immigration on wages of natives is lower when language ability matters, even for 
workers with otherwise similar skill.  Indeed, some recent work suggests that immigrants 
and natives may be complementary in the labor market (Peri and Sparber (2007) and 
Kugler and Yuksel (2006)), in which case immigrant arrivals may increase the wage of 
native-born, exactly the opposite prediction from that of the simple supply and demand 
model.22  
 The imperfect substitutability of immigrants for natives in production yields not 
just different predictions on the effect of immigration on wages but also observable labor 
market segmentation along certain dimensions.  For example, employers may find it 
optimal or preferable to group workers of the same language ability together.23  In the 
extreme case this sorting would lead to roughly two types of firms: those with workers 
                                                 
21 It can also generate differences in earnings.  McManus, Gould and Welch (1983) find that differences in 
language proficiency explain all statistically significant differences in earnings between immigrant and 
native Hispanics.  However, this study only uses a single cross-section of data and thus cannot control for 
the earnings effects of assimilation.   
22 Lewis (2006) suggests another model in which immigration increases result in no change in relative 
wages for native-born in local markets.  In particular, if immigrant labor is a substitute for automation 
technology then the change in skill ratio due to immigration has no effect on the wages of native-born. 
23 Whether this segregation is caused by profit-maximizing behavior of firms, taste or discrimination is out 
the scope of this paper.  
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fluent in English and those with non-English speakers.  This sorting may not be just 
across firms, but also within firms.  To the extent that ethnicity is correlated with 
language ability, sorting based on language ability may also yield ethnic segregation.  
Recent work exploiting rich data in employee-employer linked data sets sheds light on 
the segmentation of workers at the establishment level.  Andersson, Haltiwanger and 
Sanders (2006) find evidence of segregation based on citizenship status and based on the 
ethnicity of immigrants.  They find that recent, young immigrants in 1995 are sorted into 
construction and service industries, small firms, and into firms with other immigrants 
from the same source country.  For example, seventy-three percent of new immigrants in 
1995 worked in firms with less than ten workers compared to ten percent of native-born.  
Looking within a firm, Andersson et. al. compare the percent of workers who are 
immigrants from a given country with the percent we would expect if workers were 
distributed randomly.  Overwhelmingly, immigrants are more likely to work with other 
immigrants from their home country than we would expect if they were distributed 
randomly across firms.  For example, Chinese immigrants are 150 times as likely to work 
with other Chinese immigrants than we would predict based on their share of the 
population.  And Cuban immigrants are about 45 times as likely to work with other 
Cuban immigrants.   Overall, this work by Andersson et al. suggests that there is a high 
level of segmentation across firms by both citizenship status and ethnicity.  
 Hellerstein and Neumark (2003) find evidence of segregation of workers by 
language ability and ethnicity. Hellerstein and Neumark find that Hispanics work in 
establishments where 26.8% of the employees are Hispanic, on average.  That 
comparable statistic for Whites is only 5.5%.  Also, they find that language ability 
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explains approximately one-third of the Hispanic-White segregation in workplaces.  
Hispanics who speak English poorly work in establishments where 48.1% of the 
workforce also speaks English poorly, nearly twice what we would expect if workers 
were randomly assigned to workplaces.  These results are particularly important given 
that new U.S. immigration is increasingly Hispanic and Spanish-speaking, as described in 
Chapter 1.  Given this evidence on segmentation of the labor market, it is unrealistic to 
expect, in general, that immigrants compete directly with native-born workers.   
 Lastly, as established in the first chapter, immigrants tend to be concentrated 
geographically.  An immigrant arriving in New York City, in the short run, is obviously 
not substitutable for a native worker in Omaha.  So wage effects across geographic areas 
would have to go through other channels, such as migration of natives or firm capital or 
labor adjustments, which are also unlikely in the short run.24  Thus immigrants feasibly 
substitute for only the natives in their local area, and given the evidence above, even this 
substitution is likely very imperfect.  
 This existence of immigrant labor markets that are distinct from native labor 
markets has many potential explanations, including job and social networks, optimal 
behavior of firms, and employee preference or skill differences.  The goal of this paper is 
not to explain why segmentation occurs but to use it as background for why we should 
expect the effect of immigration on wages to be stronger for immigrants than for natives.  
 Despite this evidence of segmentation, only a few papers have analyzed the labor 
market effects of immigrants on other immigrants.  Card (1990) looks at competition 
                                                 
24 Card (2001) and Kugler and Yuksel (2006) show that there is little migration of natives across areas in 
response to immigrant inflows.  Lewis (2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show that within geographic 
areas, firm capital adjustments in response to labor supply increases such as immigration do occur in the 
short run.    
 49
among immigrants in Miami following the Mariel boatlift in the 1980s.  Card finds no 
evidence of an effect of the new Cuban immigrants on previous Cuban immigrants or on 
non-Cubans.  LaLonde and Topel (1991) use the 1970 and 1980 Censuses and find 
remarkably small negative effects considering they examine the groups most likely to be 
affected by influxes of immigrants.  They estimate that a doubling the stock of new 
immigrants decreases the wage of new immigrants by 3%.  However, when the authors 
consider the effect on older immigrants, the negative wage effects go to zero.  There are 
two reasons why LaLonde and Topel might have found only small effects.  First, 
although immigration increased markedly in the 1970s, these immigrants were entering a 
labor market with few recent immigrants to compete with.  Conversely, immigration in 
the 1980s and 1990s more than doubled the number of immigrants in the U.S. and thus 
offers a better opportunity to analyze the effect of immigrants on immigrants.  Second, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (implemented in 1968) 
changed policy on admittance and hence characteristics of immigrants.  Post-1968 
immigrant cohorts are likely not directly comparable to those before 1968, though the 
results in LaLonde and Topel are largely based on these two groups.  Immigrants of the 
1970s-1990s are probably more comparable, and these are the immigrants upon which 
my results are based.  
 In addition to estimating elasticities of substitution, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) 
estimate general equilibrium wage effects from immigration.  Surprisingly, they find that 
due to quick capital adjustments, native workers actually gain from immigration.25  For 
example, on average (across education groups), native workers gained 1.8% in wages due 
                                                 
25 Lewis (2006) provides further evidence of how the availability of low-skilled labor may affect capital 
adjustments in manufacturing plants, specifically, and how this may explain why immigration has little 
effect on the wages in U.S. local labor markets. 
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to immigration over 1990-2004.  On the other hand, they find that immigrant workers lost 
on average 19% of real wages due to immigration over the period.  Working 
concurrently, I have used a partial equilibrium approach over a longer time period and 
find results with the same order of magnitude to those of Ottaviano and Peri.  I believe 
my study and the recent work by Ottaviano and Peri are the two most recent papers on 
the effect of immigration on wages of immigrants.  However, I also find an effect for the 
period preceding the Ottaviano and Peri (2006) study.  
 Beyond adding to the literature on the wage effects of immigration, another goal 
of this paper is to ascertain the effects of increasing immigrant competition on wage 
assimilation of immigrants.  Many papers examine the assimilation of immigrants in the 
U.S. economy (Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1985, 1991, 1995), and Duleep and Regets 
(1996)).  These find immigrant characteristics (non-U.S. experience, legal status, country 
of origin) lead to lower initial wages but the importance of such characteristics declines 
over time.  Immigrants are found to catch up to natives or other relevant comparison 
groups.  Borjas (1985 and 1995) finds that the assimilation results are different for 
different arrival cohorts of immigrants.  In particular, new immigrants in the 1970s and 
1980s start with lower initial wages.  Their wage growth over time in the U.S. is not any 
faster than for earlier cohorts, so the initial wage disadvantage has significant 
implications for their assimilation.   Since these estimates control for observable skill and 
labor market conditions, the remaining disparity in initial wages is attributed to declining 
cohort quality.  Interestingly, Borjas and Friedberg (2006) find that cohort quality 
increases for new arrivals over the 1990s.26  I will add to this part of the immigration 
                                                 
26 Their study finds that the increase in entry wage over the 1990s is driven by changes at the top and 
bottom of the skill distribution.  At the top, it is driven by changes in immigration policy favoring high-
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literature by analyzing whether immigrant concentration affects immigrant wage 
differentials across cohorts.  An alternative explanation to declining cohort quality over 
the 1970s and 1980s is increasing immigrant competition.   
 
3.3 Hypothesis and Implementation 
 The two main hypotheses in this chapter are (1) that increasing concentration of 
immigrants within a local area drives down the wages of other immigrants and (2) that 
this increasing concentration can partially explain why unobserved immigrant arrival 
cohort quality declines.  I will test these quantity and quality hypotheses using Census 
Public Use Microdata from 1970-2000.  The general empirical strategy of correlating 
immigrant wages with the concentration of immigrants in a local area is made possible by 
the growth and dispersion of immigrants in the U.S. over the period, providing 
identifying variation.  However, there are two major sources of bias that may confound 
the analysis.   
 First, there may be attenuation bias if immigrants make their location choice 
based on local wages.  Suppose immigrants choose a city because it offers higher average 
wages.  Then we would observe high immigrant wages in cities with high levels of 
immigrant concentration and vice versa.  This positive correlation is generated by 
location choice rather than by causal effects of immigrant concentration on wages.  So in 
my empirical strategy, I must parse out the wage effect due to immigrant concentration 
from the effect of endogenous location choice.  In the literature, one popular method for 
dealing with this endogeneity is to instrument using the 1970 settlement patterns of 
                                                                                                                                                 
skilled immigrants (H-1B program).  And at the bottom it is driven by the decline in wages of native high 
school dropouts and the increase in earnings of Mexican immigrants.  However, even after accounting for 
these changes, the majority of the increase in entry wage is still unexplained.  
 52
immigrants.  However, as described in Chapter 1, immigrants are increasingly likely to 
locate in “new places”.  So the strength of the instrument declines over the period of my 
study.  Evidence for this was given in Chapter 1, where I compare the geographic 
distribution and concentration of immigrants in 1980, 1990, and 2000 to that in 1970 
(Figures 1-4 through 1-6). I find that another method proposed in the literature is more 
powerful.  I handle the endogeneity problem by using multiple years of data and year 
fixed effects.27  Thus identification comes from changes in immigrant concentration and 
changes in wage.  The identification assumption is that immigrant location choice may be 
endogenously affected by wages but, because immigrants cannot predict perfectly, 
changes in immigrant concentration are not affected by changes in wages.   
 Second, over the period new immigrants are increasingly likely to go to “new 
places”, metropolitan areas that traditionally received few immigrants (Singer (2004)).  
This is helpful variation in the concentration of immigrants.  However, many of the “new 
places” immigrants settle in have lower average wages than the traditional immigrant 
gateway cities.28  Why would immigrants choose to settle in places with lower wages and 
fewer similar individuals?   My hypotheses provide one possible explanation: although 
wages are lower on average, so is competition.  Failing to account for this movement to 
new places with lower average wages could generate a downward bias in the correlation 
between immigrant concentration and wages of new immigrants over time.  For example, 
average wages are lower in Atlanta than in Chicago.  Chicago has always received a large 
number of new immigrants.  Immigrants were not likely to live in Atlanta in 1970-1990, 
but were much more likely to live there in 2000.  Thus, the average wage of new 
                                                 
27 In the absence of specification error, this is equivalent to using first differences. 
28 Appendix A lists the major metropolitan areas used in this study, along with the average wage and 
fraction immigrant over 1970-2000.  
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immigrants over time may appear to decrease with immigrant concentration, not because 
of a causal relationship but because over time immigrants are more likely to live in cities 
with lower wages.  To reduce the bias from this artificial correlation, all of the wage 
effects of immigration on immigrants will be measured relative to natives within local 
areas.  This controls for wage effects due to local labor market conditions unrelated to 
immigration.  I assume that local market conditions, other than the concentration of 
immigrants, affect natives and immigrants in the same way.29 
 I will expand upon the standard immigrant wage model found in much of the 
literature by incorporating a measure of immigrant concentration and the bias corrections 
described above.  This implementation in some ways bridges the literature on the effects 
of immigration on native wages and the literature on immigrant wage assimilation.  Like 
the former, I correlate wages with immigrant concentration.  And like the latter, I show 
that conclusions about immigrant wage assimilation are misleading without including the 
effects of immigrant concentration. 
 A typical wage model for immigrants begins with a basic human capital model 
and adds immigrant status and time in the U.S. (Borjas (1985, 1995), Bratsberg et al 
(2006)).  Since assimilation affects the wages of immigrants, it is important to control for 
their time in the U.S. when modeling wages.  I chose to model immigrant wages using 
the following specification:  
         '( )it it tc c t it
c t t
Log wage X Cohortβ θ γ ε= + + +∑∑ ∑              (1.a) 
where Log(wage)it gives the log weekly wage of immigrant i in period t, and X contains 
education, age, and education-age interactions.  Indicator γt captures time effects.  
                                                 
29 Recent evidence in Bratsberg et al (2006) suggests that this assumption may need to be relaxed.  They 
find that unemployment rates affect immigrants differently than natives.  
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Cohortc are dummy variables indicating the year of arrival in the U.S.  The cohort effects 
θtc capture differences in wages of immigrants attributable the date of their arrival and the 
Census year.  The year-cohort effects θtc allow estimation of immigrant wage growth 
both across and within cohorts, which is the key decomposition used for analyzing cohort 
quality changes.30  The combination of cohort and year allows one to estimate the effect 
of years since migration on immigrant wages.  For example, in 1970 the immigrants who 
arrived between 1960 and 1964 were in the U.S. for 6-10 years and in 1980 the 
immigrants who arrived between 1970 and 1974 were also in the country for 6-10 years.  
The coefficients on these variables estimate the effect of 6-10 years of U.S. experience, 
allowing it to vary by decade.  Previous literature on immigrant wages suggests that the 
cohort-year effects should be negative and increasing with time in the U.S.  For instance, 
in 1980, the 1970-1974 cohort is expected to have a smaller wage penalty than the 1975-
79 arrival cohort.  And by 1990, each of these cohorts is expected to have a smaller wage 
penalty than they did in 1980.    
 Because model (1.a) includes age, cohort, and year effects, it is under-identified.  
The common solution is to use natives to identify the period effects.  The assumption is 
that β and γt  are identical for immigrants and natives.31  The model of native wages is just 
as above but excluding arrival cohort effects.  Then immigrants and natives are pooled 
                                                 
30 This is the key decomposition in Borjas (1985).  But this specification does not exactly replicate his 
methodology.  His model is estimated on immigrants only and includes dummy variables for marital status, 
work disability, and urban/rural and is estimated separately by year and race (an alternative is to is fully 
interact Model (2) with year and race).  He also uses years of schooling instead of dummy variables for 
educational attainment and uses years of experience instead of dummies for age, as I do.  In calculating 
within- and across-cohort effects, Borjas allows the mean personal characteristics, X,  to vary with race, 
year, and cohort.  I will assume that they do not vary.  I find that the changes I have made make little 
difference in the results.  My methodology is a parsimonious way to both establish the stylized facts about 
cohort wage growth and also to identify the effects of immigrant competition and location choice (Section 
VI) in the same formulation of the model.  This allows me to compare my results more easily.   
31 It is not necessary to assume β is identical for immigrants and natives, but I find only small differences, 
so I make the restriction for simplicity.   
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and estimated jointly.  Natives identify the period effects, which allows identification of 
the immigrant arrival cohort effects off of immigrant wages.  I call this pooled approach 
model (1), which can be represented as: 
  '( )it it tc c i t it
c t t
Log wage X Cohort Iβ θ γ ε= + + +∑∑ ∑       (1) 
where Ii is an indicator variable for immigrants.  Note that in this pooled model the fact 
that the identification of the period effects is made from native wages means that the 
year-cohort effects on the wages of immigrants are interpreted as wage effects relative to 
the wages of natives in the same year.  This is the basic model I will use for establishing 
continuity with the previous literature on cohort quality (Borjas (1985, 1995) and Borjas 
and Friedberg (2006)).   
 In order to bridge from the literature on immigrant wage assimilation to the effect 
of immigration on wages, I add a measure of immigrant concentration to the model.  As 
described in Chapter 1, the measure I use is the fraction of immigrants by MSA and year.  
Under the first hypothesis, the fraction of immigrants has a negative effect on the wages 
of immigrants.  This is directly testable in the following model, which is an extension of 
model (1): 
                '( ) ( )it it tc c i t mt i it
c t t
Log wage X Cohort I Frac I Iβ θ γ λ ε= + + + +∑∑ ∑         (2) 
where m indexes MSA.  Under my first hypothesis, λ<0, that is, as the fraction immigrant 
in an MSA rises, wages of immigrants fall.  Continuity with the literature is established 
by interacting the last term with a dummy variable for native workers instead of 
immigrant workers.  In this case, λ is expected to be positive.   
 As established in Chapter 1, not only are many new immigrants arriving in the 
U.S., but they are also going to new locations, some of which have typically lower wages 
than the traditional immigrant-receiving areas.  So there are two effects which may make 
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λ negative: increasing competition among immigrants and lower wages in new 
immigrant-receiving areas.  The first is the effect I would like to isolate, so I use the 
variation in the number and location of new immigrants to distinguish the two.  Instead of 
estimating immigrant wage penalties relative to all natives in a given year, I estimate 
immigrant wages relative to all natives in the same MSA and year.  This is a valid 
strategy for distinguishing the two effects provided that local labor market conditions 
affect immigrants and natives identically conditional on the other covariates in the model 
(age, education, and cohort).  To implement this, I change the simple year effects to year-
MSA fixed effects:  
               '( ) ( )it it tc c i mt mt i it
c t t m
Log wage X Cohort I Frac I Iβ θ δ λ ε= + + + +∑∑ ∑∑      (3) 
where δmt is a fixed effect that varies by year and metropolitan area.  In this model, 
identification of the immigrant concentration measure comes from the variation in 
immigrant wages relative to native wages across year and within metropolitan area.  This 
regulates the difference in local labor market conditions across different areas, which 
could otherwise lead to spurious conclusions.  
 Within model (3) I can test some of the implications from the evidence on labor 
market segmentation.  For instance, if immigrant labor markets are indeed segregated by 
ethnicity, then the effect of Frac(I)mt should be stronger for Hispanic workers, since most 
new immigrants are Hispanic.  Similarly, the effect is expected to be stronger for poor 
English speakers.  Across all specifications I will test whether the measures of immigrant 
concentration have an independent effect on wages of immigrants.  This is a simple F test 
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of the null hypothesis that including immigrant concentration in the model has no 
statistically significant effect.32  
 The second part of the analysis has two goals: establish cohort quality results for 
the 1990s and test the hypothesis that immigrant concentration can explain a portion of 
them.  Starting from the basic model (1), I extend the well-known findings of Borjas 
(1985, 1995) on cohort quality to the 1990s.  I follow Borjas in decomposing cross-
sectional wage growth from 1990 to 2000 into two pieces: differences in cohort wages 
across time (within cohort wage growth) and differences in cohort wages holding time in 
U.S. constant (across cohort wage growth).  This latter measure is the one relevant to 
cohort quality conclusions.  Let θtc estimate the wage effect in year t of being an 
immigrant of cohort c.  Then the cross-sectional wage growth relative to cohort c+10 is 
θtc- θt,c+10. This measures how the extra ten years of U.S. labor market experience 
benefited immigrants in year t.  It can be decomposed as follows:  
  θtc- θt,c+10 =  [θtc- θt-10,c] +[θt-10,c- θt,c+10] 
                  = [within-cohort growth] + [across-cohort growth] 
Within-cohort growth measures how an extra ten years of experience in the U.S. 
benefited cohort c, and is calculated as θtc- θt-10,c.  Last, we can examine how immigrants 
with the same years since migration but different year of arrival (i.e. different cohort) 
fared in different years.  This is the across-cohort growth in wages.  As I explained 
previously, the across-cohort growth in wages is the difference in wages across decades 
holding years in U.S. constant.  Across-cohort growth is calculated as: θt-10,c- θt,c+10. If 
                                                 
32 Thus, Model (1) is taken as the restricted model and Model (3) as the unrestricted.  The test statistic is 
{(RSSrestricted – RSSrnrestricted)/(number of restricted coefficients)}/{RSSrnrestricted/(number of observations – 
number of unrestricted coefficients)}. 
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across-cohort growth is positive then we conclude that unobserved cohort quality has 
declined.  
 Borjas (1985, 1995) shows that across-cohort growth makes up a substantial 
portion of cross-sectional wage growth of certain groups of immigrants.  For instance in 
the 1985 paper, he finds that new Mexican immigrants in 1970 did much better than new 
Mexican immigrants in 1980, as measured by the across-cohort growth of 1965-1969 
immigrants in 1970 compared to 1975-79 immigrants in 1980. The same pattern is 
established for immigrant wages over the 1980s in Borjas (1995).  As human capital 
differences were controlled for, he interprets the findings as evidence of declining 
unobserved quality of immigrants.   
 Given the growth and dispersion of immigrants described in Chapter 1, it is not 
clear that the story of declining immigrant quality over the 1970s and 1980s will hold for 
the most recent decade.  Using the cohort-year effects estimated model (1), I analyze the 
wage growth patterns of immigrants over the 1990s, focusing on the across-cohort 
growth measure. 
 After analyzing the wage growth in the basic model, I will examine how the 
cohort-year effects change upon adding MSA controls and then immigrant concentration.  
I will focus on whether or not the entry wage differential of new immigrants across 
decades (across-cohort wage growth) changes considerably first between models (1) and 






 I use 1970-2000 Census Integrated Public Use Microdata33 to estimate the models 
outlined in Section 3.3.  Since the goals of this paper involve estimating cohort effects, I 
must be able to determine year of immigration.  For this reason, 1960 is omitted from the 
analysis, as this information is not available (metropolitan area is also not identifiable).  
The immigrant arrival cohorts that can be defined from the Census are: before 1950, 
1950-1959, 1960-1964, 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999.  Immigrants are defined as born outside the U.S. and its 
territories and either naturalized or non-citizen.34  Latin American immigrants are defined 
as those born in Mexico, Central and South America.35  
 I use the 1% metro samples for 1970-1990, and both the 5% and 1% weighted 
samples for 2000.36  I will restrict my analysis to MSAs that have at least one immigrant 
and one native in each year.  As a result I will be using the 119 major MSAs; these are 
listed in Appendix A.  Further sample restriction criteria are as follows.  The analysis is 
                                                 
33 Ruggles et al (2004). 
34 Thus, for example, persons born abroad to American parents are not considered immigrants.  
35 Undocumented immigrants comprise a significant portion of the immigrant population in the U.S., 
especially of the Mexican and Central American immigrant population.  The difficulty in obtaining a 
reliable count of these unauthorized immigrants is a challenge to almost any research in this area.  Evidence 
suggests that over time the Census has improved data collection on undocumented immigrants, from a 40% 
undercount of undocumented Mexican immigrants in 1980 to a 30% undercount in 1990 and a 10% 
undercount in 2000 (Card and Lewis (2005)).  Hence the potential for undercounting of the undocumented 
immigrant population is likely to decrease over the period of my study.  However, Census data captures 
more of the undocumented population than any other nationally representative survey.  An undercount 
would bias the MSA-level immigrant concentration measure downwards and likely bias average immigrant 
wages upwards.  Thus I may understate the negative correlation between immigrant concentration and 
immigrant wages.  Since undercounting declines over time, this understating declines over time (assuming 
undocumented immigrant wages are consistently lower than documented immigrant wages).  Any bias in 
the present study due to undercounting of undocumented immigrants is similar to the bias introduced in 
virtually any other study of immigration on a national level.  
36 The reason I do not use larger samples for 1980-1990 is that the geography of the 5% samples does not 
allow complete identification of MSA.  The restrictions in both geography and variables defining 
immigrants and cohorts do not allow me to use other 1% samples available for 1970.  
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restricted to men ages 18-55, who are in the labor force, not self-employed or in the 
military, and not in group quarters.  Data is weighted by person-level weights. 
 To control for education, I construct four categorical dummies for high school 
dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate or higher.37  I will use 
log weekly wages, calculated as income from wages divided by weeks worked, both 
measured in the year before survey.  Weekly wage is measured in 1999 dollars, adjusted 
by the CPI.  Weeks worked is taken as the midpoint of the values defined as intervals.  
Also, topcoded values of income are adjusted by multiplying by a factor of 1.5, as typical 
to the literature.  Observations with zero income from wages or zero weeks worked are 
excluded.  
 
3.5 The Effect of Immigrant Concentration 
3.5.1  Results from the Basic Model 
 This section examines the hypothesis that immigrants have a negative effect on 
wages of immigrants by implementing models (1) through (3) above.  Table 3-1 Column 
1 shows the year-cohort effects estimated in Model (1).  Appendix G provides the 
estimates on the other covariates, which are all consistent with the standard human capital 
results in the literature.  The year-cohort effects are also as expected from previous 
literature.  In each year, new immigrants have the largest wage penalty.  For instance in 
1980, immigrants in the U.S. only 0-5 years (the 1975-79 cohort) have 27% lower wages 
than natives.  This penalty decreases with time in the U.S. (following the estimates down 
the column within the same year).  For example, in 1980 immigrant in the U.S 6-10 years 
                                                 
37 The IPUMS variable “educrec” defines these dummies, which is in accord with the algorithm suggested 
by Jaeger (1997). 
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have about 19% lower wages than natives, compared to the 27% of the next newest 
cohort.   
 Column 2 of Table 3-1 implements model (2), which adds MSA-year fixed effects 
in order to control for wage differentials across local markets.  This changes the 
identification of the model from variation across all individuals within year to variation 
across individuals within MSA across time.  I would not expect this difference to change 
the estimated effects of personal characteristics, X.  Indeed, those coefficients do not 
change much (see Appendix G Column 2).  Also the cohort-year effects for 1970 and 
1980 also change very little.  This is consistent with the fact that as of 1970, most MSAs 
had few immigrants, and the majority of MSAs did not experience large increases in the 
number of immigrants until the 1980s and 1990s.  The cohort-year effects for 1990 and 
2000 are consistently more negative than those in Column 1.  Accounting for local wages 
makes the level of immigrant wages look slightly worse.  In the next section I will 
analyze whether these fixed effects have an impact on across-cohort wage growth.  
 Next I directly measure the effect of concentration of immigrants on wages as 
proposed in model (3).  In Column 3, we see that the effect is negative and statistically 
significant, as expected given the hypothesis.  Because the immigrant cohort effects 
jointly give the penalty to being an immigrant in the labor market, the Frac(I) variable 
measures the additional affect to being an immigrant in an MSA with a higher or lower 
concentration of immigrants.  This shows the simple result that a higher ratio of 
immigrants in a local area is correlated with lower wages of immigrants.  The F-test 
comparing Column 3 to Column 2 (the restricted model) leads to a rejection of the null 
that Frac(I) has no effect.  The estimate suggests that for a 10 percentage point increase 
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in the fraction of immigrants in an MSA, there is a corresponding 2.7% decrease in the 
wages of immigrants relative to natives in the MSA. This estimate is larger than previous 
estimates on immigrants and much larger than most wage effects estimated on natives.  
Table 3-2 gives the mean Frac(I) across MSAs and for a variety of subgroups that will be 
tested further.  The mean fraction immigrant across MSAs over the entire study period 
was 7.6%.  A 10 percentage point increase in this average fraction immigrant would 
imply between a doubling and tripling of the immigrant population, assuming no growth 
in native population.38  It is worth noting that many MSAs experienced at least a 10 
percentage point increase in the fraction of immigrants over the study period, and many 
experienced that change within multiple single years. 
 All estimates presented thus far regard immigrant wages relative to natives.  So it 
is natural to ask what is the effect of immigrant concentration on native wages?  To do so, 
we want to replace Frac(I)mt Ii with Frac(I)mt Ni where Ni  is an indicator variable for 
native-born.  However, this change makes model (3) under-identified since both the 
fraction immigrant and the MSA-year effects vary only by MSA and year.  The closest 
specification which is fully identified is to separate MSA-year effects into MSA and year 
effects.  This specification is less flexible than model (3), since MSA effects are not 
allowed to vary over time.  First I estimate such a model first with Frac(I)mt Ii to ensure 
that the change in specification does not change the conclusion that immigrants affect the 
wages of immigrants (relative to natives in MSA).  Then I re-estimate model (4) using 
Frac(I)mt Ni to uncover the effect of fraction immigration on the wages of natives.  
                                                 
38 Note that LaLonde and Topel (1991) estimate a 3% decrease in the wage of new immigrants from a 
doubling of the number of immigrants over the 1970s.  This is in similar range to my estimate except that I 
find the effect across all immigrants, which is much stronger than finding an effect on the subpopulation 
most likely to be affected by competition.   
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         '( ) ( )it it tc c i t m mt i it
c t t m
Log wage X Cohort I Frac I Iβ θ γ η λ ε= + + + + +∑∑ ∑ ∑       (4) 
 
where once again γt are period effects and ηm are MSA fixed effects.  Estimation of λ is 
given in Table 3-3 Panel 2.  Altering the fixed effects in this way only slightly changes 
the estimate of the effect on immigrants, suggesting that for a 10 percentage point 
increase in the fraction immigrant, there is a corresponding 2% decrease in the wages of 
immigrants.  The effect on natives is strong and positive.  For a 10 percentage point 
increase in the fraction immigrant within an MSA, there is a 4.3% increase in the wage of 
natives relative to immigrants.  Since native wages are positively correlated with 
immigrant concentration, increasing immigrant concentration may actually exacerbate the 
native-immigrant wage disparity.  
 If the adverse effect of immigrant concentration is coming from segmentation of 
the labor market into native and immigrant workers, then we also expect evidence of 
further segmentation by ethnicity and language.  Table 3-3 Panels 3-5 tests this prediction 
using a number of different measures.  The basic idea in this section is to break down the 
explanatory variable Frac(I)mt Ii in Model (3) into components according to language, 
race, and other measures.  In all cases, the decomposition will sum to this same 
explanatory variable.  For example, suppose immigrants are classified into two groups, 
those who are fluent in English and those who are not.  Let Ii f indicate that immigrant i is 
fluent and Ii nf  indicate that immigrant i is not.  Then Ii  = Ii f + Ii nf  and Frac(I)mt = 




year t who are fluent or not fluent, respectively.  So decomposing one or both of the 
variables could yield the following three specifications: 
 Frac(I)mt Ii = Frac(I)mt Ii f + Frac(I)mt  Ii nf 
        = Frac(I f)mt Ii  + Frac(I nf)mt  Ii  
       = Frac(I f)mt Ii f + Frac(I f)mt Ii nf  + Frac(I nf)mt Ii f + Frac(I nf)mt Ii nf 
I will use one or more of these decompositions to test whether the model is consistent 
with the predictions from the labor market segmentation hypothesis. 
 First, I examine whether the effects are differential by language.  Starting in 1980, 
the Census asked respondents if they spoke English at home and, if so, how well.  From 
this question I define two groups of immigrants: non-fluent in English and fluent in 
English.  I define non-fluency as the response “does not speak English” or “speaks 
English but not well”.  And I define fluency in English as the responses “speaks only 
English”, “speaks very well”, and “speaks well”.   These variables are available for 1980-
2000 only, so I drop 1970 for this part of the analysis.  The coarseness of this variable 
will bias against finding any differential effects of immigrant concentration by language 
ability.39  In model (3), I replace the immigrant dummy variable Ii with its two 
component dummy variables defining the mutually-exclusive language groups and 
identify two separate λ’s, one for each language.  Panel 3 gives these estimates.  As 
expected, the effects of immigrant concentration are stronger for immigrants who are not 
fluent in English.  Immigrants who speak English are less likely to be affected by 
segmentation of the labor market by language, and indeed, the effect of fraction 
                                                 
39 Alternative definitions for language ability yield the same conclusions in the analysis that follows.  For 
example, if I define three levels of fluency (speaks only English, speaks English very well, or well vs. 
speaks English but poorly vs. does not speak English) or using the language spoken at home (English, 
Spanish or other language) the interpretation of the results is the same. 
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immigrant has a much smaller negative effect on their wages.40  These results are 
consistent with the evidence in the literature on labor market segmentation by language.  
 Next, I separate immigrants into two groups based on country of origin: 
immigrants from Latin America and all other immigrants.41  I expect the fraction of own-
ethnicity immigrants to have a stronger effect on wages than cross-ethnicity effects.  
Panel 4 shows first that the fraction of all immigrants by MSA and year has a stronger 
effect on immigrants from Latin America.  For a ten percentage point increase in the 
fraction of immigrants, Latin American immigrants wages are 3.7% lower, whereas 
immigrants from other source countries only experience a 1.8% decrease in their wage.  
To probe these correlations further, I decompose the fraction immigrant into fraction of 
immigrants from Latin America and fraction from other countries.  Panel 5 shows that the 
fraction of Latin American immigrants has a four-times larger effect on the wages of 
Latin American immigrants than on that of non-Latin American immigrants.  
Interestingly, the effect of the fraction immigrants from non-Latin American countries 
also has a larger effect on the wages of Latin American immigrants than non-Latin 
American immigrants.  Since this latter group is very heterogeneous, I will next explore a 
finer classification of immigrants by ethnicity. 
 Separating fraction immigrant into more than two ethnic categories further reveals 
which groups are most affected by immigrant concentration.  I classify immigrants into 
the following racial groups: Mexican, Cuban, other Hispanic, Asian, Black (non-
Hispanic) and White (non-Hispanic), and other.42  Panel 6 shows the effects of fraction 
                                                 
40 The within- and across- language group results are less clearly interpretable.  See Appendix H. 
41 Latin America is defined as Mexico, Central America, and South America. 
42 Finer classification becomes difficult, as there are not enough immigrants of each type in each MSA.   
Also, this is the same classification used in previous immigration literature (for example, Borjas (1985)).  
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immigrant on the wages of immigrants by race.  As expected, white immigrant wages are 
not negatively affected by concentration of immigrants, indeed they appear to be 
positively affected.  The only other ethnic group whose wage effects are smaller than the 
effects estimated on immigrant overall (Panel 1) are Cuban immigrants.  The other wage 
effects range from about a 3% decrease to a 5% decrease.  For Blacks, the estimates are 
the largest, though considering the average fraction of Black immigrants across MSAs is 
so small, this large wage effect is less striking.  These results reveal that the negative 
correlation between immigrant wages and concentration is not driven entirely by one 
ethnic group.  Note that if race fixed effects are added to the model, the estimates in 
Panel 6 do not change drastically, except that the white estimate is small and negative.43  
Thus the differential effect of immigrant concentration by ethnicity is not driven solely 
by differential earnings across ethnic groups.  
 Model (3) accounts for education, but I also show that the effects are not coming 
from immigrants of a certain education level, which was the major finding in Chapter 2.  
Similar to the above analysis within ethnicity, I parse immigrants into four education 
groups: high school dropouts, high school graduates, those with some college, and 
college graduates.  First I estimate whether the effect of immigrant concentration differs 
across these groups, shown in Table 3-4 Panel 1.  Although the effect is largest on the 
high school graduate group of immigrants, all four estimates are not strikingly dissimilar.  
The adverse wage effects are not restricted to the lowest education group.44   
 
                                                 
43 See Appendix I. 
44 The results are roughly the same if the entire regression is estimated on one or more education group 
alone.  When estimated on high school dropouts and high school graduates only, the estimate on Frac(I) is 
-0.178 (0.017).  On high school dropouts only, the estimate is -0.255 (0.032).  On those with some college 
and college graduates, the estimate is -0.286 (0.014).   
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3.5.2 Specification Checks 
 I find that the effect of Frac(I) increases by year.  This is shown in Table 3-5 
Panel 2.  The differences in the 1970 and 1980 coefficients on fraction immigrant are not 
statistically different, but there are statistically significant differences in the other years.  
The level of the fraction varies markedly by year, as shown in Table 3-2.  However, there 
are few strong a priori reasons to expect its effect to vary by year.  Increasing labor 
market segmentation is a potential explanation, although evidence on this is hard to 
find.45  Alternatively, the increasing effect over time may indicate that the relationship 
between fraction immigrant and wages of immigrants is not best captured linearly.  Given 
that the fraction immigrant increases across time, non-linearities in the relationship 
between concentration and wages could easily show up as increasing effects over time in 
the linear model.46   Hence I test alternative functional forms on the immigrant 
concentration measure to uncover the true underlying relationship between concentration 
and wages.  First, I estimate the effect of the natural logarithm of Frac(I).  These results 
are in Panel 3.  It suggests that a 10 percent increase in fraction immigrant in an MSA is 
correlated with 4 percent lower wages of immigrants.   This is roughly on par with the 
estimate from the linear model around the mean of Frac(I).  Hence the logarithmic 
specification does not add much beyond the linear specification. Indeed, it cannot explain 
the growth in the effect of fraction immigrant by year (see Panel 3b).  A quadratic 
                                                 
45 Hellerstein, Neumark and McInerney (2006) find no decline in workplace segregation by ethnicity and 
race between 1990 and 2000.  Black-white segregation and segregation by education increase, while 
Hispanic-white workplace segregation is virtually unchanged.  In addition, Census improvements of 
measuring the undocumented immigrant population over time may also explain some of the increasingly 
negative estimates by year, but this hypothesis is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to test.    
46 Consider, for example, a quadratic relationship.  In 1970, since the fraction is low, the coefficient is 
estimated off of the flat portion of the curve.  In 2000 since the fraction is very high, the coefficient is 
estimated off of the steep portion of the curve.   
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specification does fit the data well, as shown in Panel 4.  However, including a quadratic 
term does not change the difference in the linear terms by year (see Panel 4b).47   
 The logarithmic and quadratic specifications do not appear to approximate the 
true relationship any better than the linear, so last I turn to non-parametric specifications.  
These are presented in Panel 5.  Using the deciles of the distribution of the fraction 
immigrant over the entire period, I assign indicator variables to each MSA and year 
according to which decile it falls into.  Then, in model (3) I replace Frac(I) with nine 
Frac(I) decile dummy variables (dropping the lowest decile).  Except for the 60-70th and 
70-80th percentiles, the effects of fraction immigrant decrease monotonically.  Since 
MSAs at the beginning of the period are more likely to fall in the bottom of the 
distribution and the opposite for MSAs at the end of the period, this specification reveals 
why the negative effect of fraction immigrant worsens with time.   
 The previous specification also suggests that the effects of immigrant 
concentration are not homogeneous across MSAs with different size immigrant 
populations.  To address this concern I identify a more homogeneous set of MSAs over 
which I re-estimate model (3).  I start by estimating the range of fraction immigrant that 
is consistent over the entire period.  This is essentially the common support.  I calculate 
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the fraction immigrant for each year.  Then I define the 
common support from the maximum of the 5th percentile across the years to the minimum 
of the 95th percentile across the years.  There are twenty-three MSAs that fall in the 
common support in every year.  In 1970 there are 61 MSAs in the common support, 60 in 
1980, 57 in 1990, and 73 in 2000.  These MSAs are listed in Table 3-6.  
                                                 
47 Even when calculating the total effect at the mean of the fraction immigrant from the linear and quadratic 
terms by year, the differences do not disappear.  
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 Using the sample of MSAs that always fall into the common support of fraction 
immigrant, I find that the effect of fraction immigrant is still negative but much smaller.  
Results are given in Table 3-5 Panel 6-7.  The differences in this effect are not as striking 
across years.  The 1970 and 1980 effects are not statistically different, nor are the 1990 
and 2000 effects.  If instead I include an MSA in any year that it fell into the common 
support, the results are qualitatively similar.  Only the 1970 effect of fraction immigrant 
is statistically different from the others.  Quantitatively, the effects are much closer to the 
basic model (3) estimates in Panel 1.  This analysis over the common support of the 
fraction immigrant variable also minimizes concerns about minimum wage workers 




 The identification of immigrant concentration’s effects on immigrant wages 
above may be impeded by the argument that there is a negative correlation between 
immigrant concentration and immigrant skill.  MSAs with large concentrations of 
immigrants may offer immigrant-preferred goods or services as well as job information 
or opportunities.  A large ethnic enclave may lower the return to certain skills, for 
example the return to learning English (as suggested in McManus (1990)).  Living 
outside of an immigrant enclave, then, may be an indicator of or an incentive to obtain 
greater skill.  If immigrants who live in less immigrant-concentrated areas are more 
skilled, then their wages may be higher not because they face less competition but 
because they have higher marginal productivity.  
 70
 I find little evidence of correlation between immigrant concentration and skill, 
based on observable measures.  I compare MSAs in roughly the 80th and 20th percentiles 
of the fraction immigrant and find no marked difference in education, English fluency, 
industry or occupation.  Table 3-7 compares two groups of MSAs: those between the 70th 
and 80th percentiles and those in the 10-20th percentiles.  I calculate the average of each 
skill measure and present the ratio of that measure for the 70-80th percentiles relative to 
the 10-20th percentiles.  For example, I find that in 1970 the proportion of immigrants 
from Latin America was 1.85 times higher in the more concentrated MSAs (the 70-80th 
percentiles) than in the less concentrated MSAs.   Overall there is striking similarity 
between the more or less concentrated MSAs along these measures.  The education 
distribution is slightly more skewed towards low educated groups in the more 
concentrated MSAs, but that skewness virtually disappears by 2000.  I present industries 
and occupations that are common for many immigrant workers, but find no persistent 
differences in the immigrant distribution according to MSA concentration.  In the second 
panel of Table 3-7, I present the same ratios for the 80th to 90th percentile relative to the 
0-10th percentiles.  As expected, the observable immigrant skill differences between these 
groups of MSAs is larger.  Apart from the high school dropout and laborer occupation 
outliers, however, the skill differentials are not extremely large.   
 Occupation may be the strongest proxy for skill in this dataset, so to test the skill-
concentration argument further, I add occupation controls to Model (3).  Indeed there is a 
history in the literature to analyzing immigration’s effects by occupation.  Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2006) find immigration has a negative, statistically significant effect on wages 
of natives in blue collar occupations over the late 1990s.  Card (2001) also examines 
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immigration’s effects on occupation-specific wages and employment of natives and finds 
some small, negative effects although they are not stable under instrumental-variables 
specifications.  Using the occupation groupings given in the Census, I define ten indicator 
variables (1-digit 1950 occupation codes).  These are: professional and technical, farmers, 
managers and officials, clerical, sales, craftsmen, operatives, service workers, farm 
laborers, and other laborers.  With these indicators added as fixed effects (dropping the 
indicator for professional and technical), I find that the effect of immigrant concentration 
on wages of immigrants changes only slightly, to -0.288 with a standard error of 0.011.48  
In addition, I estimate the effect of immigrant concentration on the wages of immigrants 
in each of the ten occupations separately.  These estimates are presented in Table 3-4 
Panel 2.  The largest statistically significant negative effects are found on the wages of 
operatives, craftsmen, sales occupations, and clerical occupations.  There is no 
statistically significant effect on the wages of professionals or technical workers as well 
as farmers.  Since this study focuses on wages in metropolitan areas, the failure to find 
statistically significant negative effects on the wages of farmers and farm laborers is most 
likely due to the limited scope of the data rather than to the lack of a true effect.   
 Industry composition of MSAs may bias the results of the basic model in a similar 
way that the skill-concentration argument works.  For example, if immigrants are pulled 
to less concentrated MSAs by well-paying jobs in thriving industries, it could generate 
the same negative relationship between concentration and wages that has so far been 
argued as causal.  As above, I first add industry fixed effects, using the 1950 industry 
                                                 
48 I find nearly identical results for other occupation definitions, for example using the trivariate grouping: 
professional, technical and manual based on the 1970-2000 occupational codes (Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2006)). Or using six occupational groups also based on the 1970-2000 codes as in Kugler and Yuksel 
(2006). 
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classification in the Census: agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation and communication, wholesale and retail trade, FIRE, business and repair 
services, personal services, entertainment and recreation, professional and related 
services, and public administration.  The estimated effect of immigrant concentration on 
immigrant wages is increased only slightly to -0.308 with a standard error of 0.01.  The 
results for concentration by industry are also not surprising.  Statistical significance for 
the agriculture and mining industries is not found due to the urban geographic focus of 
this study.  Otherwise, the negative effects of immigrant concentration are distributed 
somewhat evenly across the other industries.   
 As a final robustness check, I test whether this model accurately captures the full 
labor market by adding unemployed and self-employed immigrants.  These individuals 
were excluded from the analysis, in keeping with previous literature, since Log wageit 
does not exist for the unemployed and because since self-employment income is hard to 
compare to wage and salary earnings.  However, these are important segments of the 
labor market.  First, it is important to note that the unemployed make up a relatively small 
portion of workers in my sample, from 3.44% in 1970 to 5% in 2000.  Also, immigrants 
and natives are roughly equally represented among the unemployed in this population.  
For example, in 1970 3.42% of immigrants in this sample were unemployed whereas 
3.44% of native-born were. The self-employed make up 9-10% of the population.  Once 
again, immigrants and natives are approximately equally likely to be self-employed; for 
example, in 2000 9.95% of natives were self-employed and 10.03% of immigrants were. 
Given these facts, I do not expect that adding unemployed and self-employed to the 
model will change the estimated effects substantially.   
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 An important distinction is that unemployment and self-employment variables in 
the Census pertain to the current year, whereas the earnings variables apply to the 
previous year.  So not only do I include currently unemployed or self-employed 
individuals, but also those who reported zero earnings for the previous year.  I find that 
between 6 and 8.6% of the population reported zero earnings from wages and salary in 
the previous year.  Immigrants appear to be slightly more likely to report zero earnings, 
for example in 2000, 7.9% of native-born reported zero wage and salary earnings in 1999 
whereas 10.91% of immigrants did so.   
 For zero earnings in the preceding year, I add them to the regression by arbitrarily 
entering a log weekly wage of -10, which corresponds roughly to a weekly wage value of 
0.00005.  I find that including these “zeros”, the currently unemployed and the self-
employed does not change the estimated effect of immigrant concentration much.  The 
results are presented in Table 3-8.  In addition, I change the dependent variable to 
estimate the effect of immigrant concentration on the employment of immigrants.  Using 
a linear probability model, I find that immigrant concentration has a statistically 
significant, but economically unimportant effect on the employment of immigrants.  
Likewise, I find a statistically insignificant effect of immigrant concentration on the 
propensity to have zero earnings in the prior year (a measure of employment in the 
previous year).  
 In summary, the main results show that immigrants compete with other 
immigrants, and this is correlated with strong adverse wage effects.  Probing further on 
this correlation, I have shown that the results are consistent with evidence of labor market 
segmentation by language and ethnicity.  The negative correlation is not driven by a 
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particular education or ethnic group.  It is also not driven by employment outcomes of 
immigrants, industry or occupation choice.     
 
3.6 Cohort Quality Results 
 In this section I will do two things: establish facts about cohort quality over the 
1990s and show that immigrant concentration can explain a substantial portion of the 
wage differential among immigrant cohorts otherwise attributed to declining quality.   
 First I confirm the Borjas (1985, 1995) results for wage growth by cohort over the 
1970s and 1980s and the Borjas and Friedberg (2006) results extending the analysis over 
the 1990s.  As described in Section 3.3, the strategy is to compare year-cohort effects in 
Model (2).  The year-cohort effects from Model (2) were presented earlier in Table 3-1 
Column 2.  Twenty-eight cohort effects, θtc, are estimated, where t=1970, 1980, 1990, 
2000.  Four cohorts, c, can be identified for 1970, six for 1980, eight for 1990, and ten for 
2000.  Recall that cross-sectional wage growth is decomposed into within-cohort wage 
growth and across-cohort growth.  As an example, consider immigrants in 1980 who 
arrived between 1965 and 1969.  The wage penalty for this group (relative to natives) is -
0.1282.  This says that in 1980 immigrants who had been in the U.S. 10-15 years earned 
12.8% less than natives.  The coefficient on the 1975-79 cohort says that immigrants in 
the U.S. 1-5 years as of 1980 earned 26.77% less than natives.  Comparing these two 
year-cohort effects, then, estimates the wage growth attributed to being in the U.S. ten 
extra years.  This is exactly the cross-sectional wage growth, θtc - θt,c+10.  The estimated 
difference, -0.1282 – (-0.2677), suggests that immigrants arriving in 1965-1969 earned 
13.95% more in 1980 than immigrants arriving in 1975-79.  This cross-sectional growth 
 75
can be decomposed into within-cohort and across-cohort growth as described in Section 
3.3.  In this particular example, the decomposition is as follows: 
Cross-sectional  =  Within + Across 
                                 (-0.1282 - -0.2677) = [-0.1282 - -0.2203] + [-0.2203 - -0.2677] 
          0.1395  = 0.0921 + 0.0474 
In this case, across-cohort growth in wage explains about one-third of the 1980 cross-
sectional wage growth between cohorts 1965-69 and 1975-79.  Borjas (1985) suggests 
this is attributable to declining cohort quality.   
 Table 3-9 Panel 1 summarizes the decomposition calculated from the coefficients 
estimated in Table 3-1 Column 2.  The 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 panels establish the 
declining cohort quality pattern over these periods.  In general, across-cohort wage 
growth is positive and a substantial portion of cross-sectional wage growth.  Interestingly, 
the 1990-2000 panel shows evidence of new trend for the 1990s.  In 2000, the difference 
between wages of older and newer immigrants (the cross-sectional wage growth) is much 
smaller than in previous periods.  Also, cohort quality appears to explain less of the 
difference between cohort wages.  In fact, unobserved cohort quality appears to increase 
for the newest cohorts of immigrants over the 1990s.  The reason behind this increase in 
entry wage of new immigrants over the 1990s remains a puzzle in the literature.  Borjas 
and Friedberg (2006) find part of the increase in unobserved quality is due to the H1-B 
visa program that favored high-skill immigrants and the rise in high school dropout 
wages of immigrants relative to natives.    
 I find that the increase in cohort quality over the 1990s is actually understated 
when local labor market differences are not accounted for.  The across-cohort figures in 
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Table 3-9 are slightly less negative when MSA-year fixed effects are not included in the 
model.49  Over the period 1990-2000 new immigrants increasingly went to “new places”, 
where average wages are lower than in historic immigrant-receiving cities.  Failing to 
account for this using native wages in a locality as the comparison group slightly 
understates the increase in unobserved cohort quality.  
 The main objective in this section is to see whether the negative effects of 
immigration on wages of immigrants can explain changes in entry wages of immigrants.  
That is, does implementing model (3) over model (2) have an effect on the across-cohort 
wage growth estimates?   To do so, first I compare the cohort-year effects in Table 3-1 
Column 2 to those in Column 3.  Including Fraction Immigrant in the model explains a 
large portion of the wage penalty attributed to cohort effects in Column 2.  This is 
increasingly the case for more recent years; the difference in estimated cohort effects is 
larger for 1990 and 2000 than for 1970 and 1980.  Next, I decompose the cohort effect 
from Column 3 into cross-section, within-cohort, and across-cohort growth.  This 
decomposition is presented in Table 3-9 Panel 2.  We see that, compared to Panel 1, 
cross-sectional wage growth changes little for most cohorts and years.  This suggests that 
immigrant competition does not affect the wage growth of immigrants with time in the 
U.S.  However, the across-cohort wage growth decreases markedly for most cohorts.  For 
instance, over 1980-1990 the across-cohort wage growth for the newest immigrants 
decreased from 5.1% to 2.9%.  The decrease in across-cohort wage growth can also be 
interpreted as a decrease in the differential entry wage of new immigrants between 1980 
and 1990.  The exception to this pattern is the two newest cohorts over 1990-2000 where 
                                                 
49 In a model including year effects only, and no MSA effect, for the 0-5 year cohort, the across-cohort 
wage growth is -0.0771.  For the 6-10 year cohort, the across-cohort wage growth is -0.0262.  Both 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 77
immigrant concentration does not appear to have an impact on cohort quality estimates.  
This exception is consistent with the idea that the dispersion of immigrants over the 
1990s to new places was in part driven by movement away from cities with high levels of 
immigrant competition.  
 Immigrant competition in local labor markets explains up to 40% of the 
differential in wages between immigrants of different cohorts but the same length of stay 
in the U.S.  Thus, failing to account for immigrant competition in the local labor market 
overstates the degree to which declining cohort quality affects the wages of immigrants.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 Immigration to the U.S. grew rapidly over the end of the 20th century.  At the 
same time, immigrant location choice has changed and brought immigrants to new places 
across the country.  In the policy world, this raises important questions about what effect 
immigrants have on local areas.  Many are concerned about the effect of immigrants on 
the wages of native workers.  This question has been much studied, and only small 
negative effects, if any, are found.  Unlike most of the literature, I estimate the effect of 
immigrants on the wages of immigrants.   
 Given the facts about labor market segmentation and non-substitutability of 
immigrant for native labor, I hypothesize that the main effects of immigrant competition 
are on wages of immigrants.  Extending typical models from the literature, I find 
evidence in support of this hypothesis.  For a ten percentage point increase in the fraction 
of immigrants in a local area, immigrants experience a 2.7% decrease in their wages.  
This result is robust to alternative specifications of the model.  And the result is stronger 
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within subgroups where competition is predicted to be even more intense because of 
labor market segmentation.  For a ten percentage point increase in the fraction of 
immigrants from Latin America in a local area, Latin American immigrants see a 4.8% 
decrease in their wage.  The fact that the concentration of immigrants has an adverse 
effect on wages of immigrants does not preclude immigrants from also negatively 
affecting the wages of natives.  This paper simply suggests that the main effects are on 
wages of immigrants. 
 In addition I show that immigrant competition has power in explaining the well-
known result suggesting that immigrant cohorts are of declining quality over 1970-1990.  
Up to 40% of the wage differential between immigrants of different cohorts at the same 
point in time of their assimilation experience can be explained by increasing competition.  
This suggests that successive cohorts may still be of lower quality over the 1970s and 
1980s but not to the degree that was previously estimated.   
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Chapter 4:  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 The remarkable growth in immigration to the U.S. in the end of the 20th century 
provides an opportunity to test economic theories of the labor market.  Recent immigrants 
are on average younger, less educated, and possess lower English language ability than 
native workers.  Understanding how this population affects the labor market has the 
potential to explain not just how immigrants affect the market but how the rise in any 
differently situated population might interact with existing workers.  
 
4.1 Findings 
 Much immigration research begins with the hypothesis of a simple model of labor 
supply and demand where an increase in supply reduces wages of all competing workers, 
including native-born.  At the local level, there is little evidence in the literature that any 
sizeable wage effect exists.  That is, under the assumption that labor markets are defined 
by local geographic borders, there are only small negative effects of the number of 
immigrants on the wages of native workers.  These studies implicitly assume that 
immigrants and natives compete within local areas but not across them.  Relaxing this 
assumption and examining the national wage effects of immigration yields strikingly 
different results.  If we assume that immigrants and natives compete within skill groups 
rather than within geographic areas, the correlation between the number of immigrants 
and the wages of native-born in skill groups is large and negative.  This result, as 
presented in Borjas (2003), suggests that a simple supply and demand theory does have 
power in explaining real world situations.   
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 In Chapter 2, Seth Sanders and I showed that although the skill group correlation 
method is appealing, it confounds the identification of the true effect of immigration on 
the wages of native-born.  The first piece of evidence is that young, high school dropouts 
drive the entire negative correlation between immigration and wages of native-born.  
Higher skilled immigrants appear to have no effect on the wages of higher skilled native-
born.  Even though immigration shocks in higher skill groups are small relative to those 
in lower skill groups, if the national market assumptions and the supply and demand 
model describe reality, the size of the shocks should not change the underlying 
correlation with wages.  We use Canadian immigration patterns as a point of comparison, 
since immigrants to Canada tend to be of higher skill.  We find that even though 
Canadian supply shocks due to immigration are in higher skill groups, there is no 
negative correlation between immigration and wages of native-born Canadians.  
 In addition we provide evidence that labor market trends other than immigration 
may be picked up in wage trends within skill groups.  For example, the wages of high 
school dropouts fell over the period of study, and many possible explanations abound, 
including skill-biased technological change, increasing negative selectivity in education, 
de-industrialization, and international trade.  The skill group methodology cannot 
dissociate these wage trends from those due to immigration.  We construct an annual 
series of wages and immigration for high school dropouts between 1974 and 2002.  
Looking only at decennial Census years, there is a negative relationship between wages 
and immigration.  This is the relationship identified in the Borjas (2003) methodology.  
However, examining inter-Census years, we find the trends are not consistent with the 
story that high school dropout immigrants have driven down the wages of high school 
 81
dropout native-born.  For example, in the early 1980s when wages of high school 
dropouts in the U.S. plummeted, immigration in this skill group was stagnant.  Also, in 
the late 1990s immigration and wages increase at nearly the same rate. 
 Overall, Chapter 2 concludes that the model where immigrants compete with 
natives within skill group on a national level yields spurious correlations between 
immigration and the wages of native-born workers.  This leaves open the question 
regarding immigration’s wage effects.  Most economists believe that an infusion of 30 
million new workers to a relatively few local areas must have an effect on wages in the 
U.S.  That is one reason the Borjas (2003) result is so appealing.  In Chapter 3 I suggest a 
view of immigration and the labor market that makes progress toward explaining the 
absence of wage effects thus far.  Namely, I provide evidence that immigrants compete 
primarily with other immigrants and thus the wage effects of immigration are observed 
first on other immigrants.  In addition to anecdotal evidence, there is growing evidence in 
the economics literature that labor markets are segregated along many dimensions that 
impact immigrants directly.  Hispanics tend to work with other Hispanics, and workers of 
similar English language ability tend to be grouped together as well.  Immigrants are 
overwhelmingly likely to work in small firms and in service and construction industries.  
They also tend to work with other immigrants from the same source country.   
 In light of the evidence on segregation of the labor market by language and 
ethnicity, it is not surprising that I find large effects of immigration on wages of 
competing immigrants.  These effects are estimated relative the wages of native-born 
workers in the same local area over time.  I find that it is important to control for trends in 
immigration settlement that affect different areas of the U.S. at different times.  After 
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identifying the effect of immigration on the wages of immigrants, I show that this 
competition result can help explain the declining entry wage of immigrants over 1970-
1990.  Namely, increasing competition can explain up to forty percent of the declining 
entry wage.  The entry wage decline has previously been attributed wholly to declining 
“quality” of new immigrants. 
 Chapter 3 explains in part why it is hard to find an effect of immigration on the 
wages of native-born workers.  Simply, the primary effect is on the wages of competing 
immigrants.  This is not to say that there is no effect of immigration on natives – either on 
their wages or other labor market outcomes – rather the findings of Chapter 3 suggest that 
the wage effects are likely smaller than was previously anticipated.  
 
4.2 Policy Implications 
 How can the above findings inform government policy on immigration?  It is first 
important to state that there are no direct policy implications from the research conducted 
here or in much of the research on the labor market effects of immigration.  No public 
policy was tested directly.  Rather, this study and others aim to further our understanding 
of how labor markets in the U.S. respond to large immigration shocks.  This 
understanding can help identify the agents in the labor market that are most affected by 
increasing immigration, the long term gains and losses to competing workers.  Without 
unbiased identification of the agents who “win” and those who “lose” due to increased 
immigration, it is nearly impossible to formulate policy to support the U.S. labor market 
in light of high levels of low-skilled immigration.  Economic research on immigration, 
however, cannot inform the debate over the equity of immigration policy.   
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 If we focus only on the labor market effects of immigration, we find that 
formulating policy quickly becomes complicated.  As with many economic situations, 
there are winners and losers in the labor market from increased immigration to the U.S.  
To fully identify winners and losers, we must consider all agents in the labor market.  The 
conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that native-born workers are not the big losers in 
terms of wage competition due to immigration.  Indeed, they may actually be better off, 
as I note in Chapter 3 (Ottaviano and Peri (2006)), due to the complementarity of 
immigrant and native labor.  The competing group that experiences wage decline is, 
instead, other immigrants.  Having identified the winners and losers in terms of wage 
competition, it may be tempting to suggest that immigration policy limit future 
immigration in order to maintain current immigrants’ wages, or to only admit more 
immigrants as long as the wage increases for the winners (natives) outweigh the wage 
losses for the losers (current immigrants).   
 However, determining the optimal inflow of immigrants is not so simple.  Even if 
immigrants are the “losers” because their wages have declined50, firms employing 
immigrant labor are “winners” because their costs have declined.  So the net effect of 
immigration on the labor market must also take account of the gains and losses to firms 
due to changing labor costs.  Changing labor costs for firms in turn affect the price of 
products.  Hence we must also consider the gains and losses to consumers who purchase 
these products.  Both natives and immigrants benefit from the declining price of goods 
produced by relatively cheaper immigrant labor (Cortes (2006)).  We have already 
                                                 
50 Of course, even if previous immigrants in the U.S. experience wage declines due to increased 
immigration, they may not be “losers” in the labor market compared to what their labor market 
opportunities would have been if they had remained in their home country.  
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established many layers of gains and losses due to immigration, and have only considered 
the labor market effects of immigration.   
 There are many other dimensions along which existing immigrants may gain from 
increased immigration.  Having more immigrants from one’s own source country can 
increase political influence and cultural capital.  For example, immigrant-owned 
businesses offering culture-specific products may benefit from increased demand.  And 
immigrant consumers may benefit from an expanding market for culture-specific 
products.   These effects are obviously difficult or impossible to measure. 
  One commonly debated effect is that on the welfare and education systems.  In 
this arena we will see that it is not only difficult to identify all the interconnected winners 
and losers due to immigration, but it is also crucial to clarify the time dimension of its 
effects.  Recent immigrants are relatively young and low-educated, making many of them 
prime candidates for welfare benefit receipt.  Despite the fact that many immigrants who 
qualify do not actually take up welfare benefits, there is major concern about their current 
and potential impact on the welfare rolls.  In addition, along with the growth in 
immigrant working adults, there is growth in the population of immigrant children.  
Whether they are born in or out of the U.S., once in the country they are entitled to an 
education.  In some local areas, the ethnic, cultural, and language mix of students is 
drastically changing.  This imposes real costs in terms of the services schools need to 
provide.  There are also intangible costs of cultural change and the benefits of increased 
diversity.   
 Whether immigrants as a whole pay in more in tax than they take out in the form 
of education and welfare is difficult to answer.  First, the estimates of tax paid by 
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immigrants vary widely, largely due to the difficulty in identifying payments by 
undocumented immigrants.  Also, the question as framed often in public debate is not 
framed appropriately in terms of the long versus short run effects.  For example, 
investment in the education of immigrant children, provided they stay in the U.S., may 
have great benefits to the economy but only in the long run.  In that sense, current 
taxpayers may be “losers” from immigration but future generations may reap the 
economic benefits of this investment in a significant portion of tomorrow’s workforce.   
 A simple economic way of approaching policy on immigration is to identify the 
gains and losses along some time horizon, as discussed here, and allow future immigrants 
only as long as the gains outweigh the losses.  This method may neglect some of the 
psychic or cultural costs and benefits because they may simply be impossible to measure.  
But it can be one way to frame a policy debate that is extremely complex.  
 Where such economic analysis of the policy problem offers no insight is in the 
equity side of the debate.  Policymakers and the public may not be willing to accept an 
immigration policy which has a net benefit but only natives experience gains and current 
immigrants experience all the losses, for example.  Research can inform public policy by 
explaining who are the winners and losers and how large are the effects.  But this analysis 
has nothing to say about the concern that young, low-skilled immigrants are the ones 
experiencing wage loss and higher-skilled native-born workers are the beneficiaries.  
Ultimately even a complete understanding of the economic effects of immigration in the 









 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
North America 11.69 9.43 4.87 2.70 2.26 
Central and South America 13.06 25.05 38.50 48.71 54.45 
Europe 67.22 50.41 29.68 16.83 13.14 
Asia 6.88 10.83 19.35 24.97 26.10 
Africa 0.32 1.03 1.82 2.57 3.49 
Other 0.81 3.26 5.81 4.22 0.56 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS, 1% sample for 1960, 6% samples for 1970-2000 










 1971 1981 1991 1996 
North America 6.04 5.62 4.89 4.65 
Central and South America 3.30 7.26 11.22 12.11 
Europe 81.77 67.91 51.30 43.58 
Asia 6.10 14.92 26.43 32.06 
Africa 1.50 3.14 5.17 5.72 
Other 1.27 1.15 0.98 1.88 
Source: Canadian Census PUMF, 1% sample for 1971, 2% samples for 1981 and 1986, 3% 





Table 2-2: Regression Results using 1960-2000 Census Data 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Native-born 
 Effect of Fraction Immigrant, θ  
Unweighted -0.538 (0.187) 
Weighted by Number in Cell -0.434 (0.219) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on education-
experience. Both regressions include fixed effects for education, experience, 






Table 2-3: Top Influential Year-Education-Experience Cells 
 
Year Education Years of 
Experience 
DFBETA Rank of 
DFBETA 
2000 HS Dropout 1-5 -0.8225 1 
1970 HS Dropout 1-5 -0.6382 2 
2000 HS Dropout 6-10 0.5949 3 
1960 HS Dropout 1-5 -0.5496 4 
2000 College Grad 36-40 -0.4157 5 
1980 College Grad 1-5 0.3550 6 
1970 HS Dropout 6-10 0.3430 7 
2000 HS Dropout 36-40 0.3133 8 
1960 College Grad 36-40 -0.2952 9 
1980 HS Dropout 1-5 0.2820 10 
1990 HS Dropout 26-30 0.2662 11 
1960 HS Dropout 6-10 0.2588 12 
1980 College Grad 16-20 0.2371 13 
1960 HS Dropout 16-20 -0.2212 14 
1980 HS Dropout 16-20 0.2202 15 
2000 Some College 6-10 0.2158 16 
1990 HS Dropout 21-25 -0.1946 17 
1970 College Grad 1-5 -0.1908 18 
2000 College Grad 11-15 0.1560 19 





Table 2-4: Percentage of Total Weight on the Regression, by Year and Education  
 
 1960 1970 1980  1990 2000 Total 
HS Dropout   4.34   3.92   3.13   14.73 25.59 51.70 
HS Grad   5.63   6.06   5.05     2.47  1.78 20.99 
Some College   4.07   4.28   3.23     2.08  1.40 15.06 
College Grad   3.61   3.04   2.04     0.45  3.10 12.24 
Total 17.65 17.31 13.45    19.72 31.88 100 










Table 2-6: Distribution of Educational Attainment of U.S. Natives, 1960-2000 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
HS Dropout 51.28 36.66 21.98 11.81       8.49 
HS Grad 27.80 35.33 37.59 33.91 31.94 
Some College 10.00 12.90 18.81 28.69 30.94 
College Grad 10.92 15.11 21.62 25.58 28.63 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Natives 
Estimate of θ using all cells: -0.434 (0.219) 
 Estimate of  θ omitting Education-Year cell: 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Total 



























































Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on education-experience. 
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Table 2-7: Regression Results for De-Constructed Regression 
 
 Estimated 1θ  Estimated 2θ  
Unweighted -0.00022   
 (0.01087) 
 0.00535   
 (0.00158) 
Weighted by Average Cell Size -0.00023   
 (0.0105) 
 0.00448    
 (0.00189) 
 Weighted by Total Cell Size -0.00240    
 (0.01047) 
  0.00395     
(0.00193) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: standard errors in parentheses are clustered by education-experience. Effects 
given per 100,000 persons.  All regressions include fixed effects for education, 





Table 2-8:  Regression Results for Canadian Census Data 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Natives 
 Effect of Fraction Immigrant, α 
Unweighted -0.175 (0.237) 
Weighted by Number in Cell -0.251 (0.264) 
Source: Canadian Census PUMF 
Note: standard errors in parentheses are clustered by education-
experience. Both regressions include fixed effects for education, 













 1971 1981 1986 1991 1996 Total 
HS Dropout   3.93   3.94   4.50   4.17   4.04 20.57 
HS Grad 13.68   4.56   4.21   3.54   3.79 29.77 
Some College   3.94   5.53   6.30   5.26   5.06 26.08 
College Grad   3.74   4.58   5.41   4.68  5.18 23.58 
Total 25.28 18.60 20.40 17.65 18.06 100.00 
Source: Canadian Census PUMF 
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Table 2-10: Regression for High School Dropouts Only, U.S. and Canada 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Natives 
 Estimated Effect of Fraction 
Immigrant,θ  
(U.S.) 
Estimated Effect of 
Fraction Immigrant, α 
(Canada) 
Original Weighted Result -0.434 (0.219) 
-0.251 
(0.264) 
Weighted Result for High 





Source: U.S. Census PUMS and Canadian Census PUMF 
Note: standard errors in parentheses are clustered by education-experience. All regressions 





Table 2-11: Testing for Measurement Error in the Canadian Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Natives 
 Original Analysis Using 6 experience Categories, with 26-40 yrs grouped together 
 Estimated Effect of 
Fraction Immigrant, α 
Estimated Effect of Fraction 
Immigrant, α 
Unweighted -0.175 (0.237) 
0.1006 
(0.273) 






Source: Canadian Census PUMF 
Note: standard errors in parentheses are clustered by education-experience.  All regressions 
include fixed effects for education, experience, year, and all two-way interactions. 
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Table 3-1:  Fixed Effects Model Estimates 
Dependent Variable:  Log Weekly Wage  
Cohort Effects by Year Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Wage effects in 1970 for:    
    1965-69 cohort -0.2203*** (0.0078) -0.2264*** (0.0078) -0.1988*** (0.0079) 
    1960-64 cohort -0.0835*** (0.0089) -0.0825*** (0.0089) -0.0529*** (0.009) 
    1950-59 cohort -0.007 (0.0071) -0.0265*** (0.0071) -0.0019 (0.0071) 
    <1950 cohort -0.0117 (0.0082) -0.0308*** (0.0081) -0.0077 (0.0082) 
Wage effects in 1980 for:    
    1975-79 cohort -0.2677*** (0.0057) -0.2658*** (0.0057) -0.2237*** (0.006) 
    1970-74 cohort -0.1866*** (0.006) -0.179*** (0.006) -0.1343*** (0.0063) 
    1965-69 cohort -0.1282*** (0.0067) -0.1135*** (0.0067) -0.069*** (0.0069) 
    1960-64 cohort -0.0488*** (0.008) -0.0298*** (0.008) 0.0134 (0.0082) 
    1950-59 cohort 0.0031 (0.0071) 0.0027 (0.007) 0.0376*** (0.0072) 
    <1950 cohort 0.0108 (0.0125) 0.0096 (0.0123) 0.0435*** (0.0124) 
Wage effects in 1990 for:    
    1985-89 cohort -0.2624*** (0.0045) -0.3171*** (0.0046) -0.2531*** (0.0052) 
    1980-84 cohort -0.2051*** (0.0046) -0.253*** (0.0047) -0.1894*** (0.0053) 
    1975-79 cohort -0.1252*** (0.0054) -0.1728*** (0.0054) -0.1112*** (0.0059) 
    1970-74 cohort -0.0674*** (0.0061) -0.1184*** (0.0062) -0.0555*** (0.0066) 
    1965-69 cohort 0.0214*** (0.0074) -0.0259*** (0.0074) 0.0339*** (0.0078) 
    1960-64 cohort 0.0736*** (0.0095) 0.0375*** (0.0095) 0.0968*** (0.0098) 
    1950-59 cohort 0.1072*** (0.01) 0.0713*** (0.0099) 0.1197*** (0.0101) 
    <1950 cohort 0.0927*** (0.0215) 0.0599*** (0.0213) 0.1059*** (0.0214) 
Wage effects in 2000 for:    
    1995-99 cohort -0.1853*** (0.0038) -0.2179*** (0.0038) -0.1543*** (0.0046) 
    1990-94 cohort -0.1789*** (0.0048) -0.2132*** (0.0048) -0.1451*** (0.0055) 
    1985-89 cohort -0.1712*** (0.0039) -0.2024*** (0.004) -0.1309*** (0.0049) 
    1980-84 cohort -0.1303*** (0.0057) -0.1596*** (0.0057) -0.0883*** (0.0063) 
    1975-79 cohort -0.099*** (0.0048) -0.1208*** (0.0048) -0.0498*** (0.0056) 
    1970-74 cohort -0.0457*** (0.008) -0.0694*** (0.008) 0.0017 (0.0085) 
    1965-69 cohort -0.0238*** (0.0081) -0.0419*** (0.0081) 0.0278*** (0.0086) 
    1960-64 cohort 0.0304** (0.0137) 0.023* (0.0136) 0.0911*** (0.0138) 
    1950-59 cohort 0.0343** (0.0152) 0.0196 (0.015) 0.0768*** (0.0152) 
    <1950 cohort 0.0802** (0.0356) 0.0596* (0.0353) 0.1147*** (0.0353) 
Frac(I)*I   -0.2712*** (0.0108) 
Year*MSA Effects NO YES YES 
Year Effects YES NO NO 
Educ, Age, Educ*Age 
effects YES YES YES 
F statistic    633.99 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS Note: Each regression is estimated from 2,402,986 observations. 






















 Average Across MSAs (SD) 
Frac(I) 0.076 (0.090) 
Frac(I) in 1970 0.040 (0.040) 
Frac(I) in 1980 0.058 (0.064) 
Frac(I) in 1990 0.082 (0.097) 
Frac(I) in 2000 0.124 (0.116) 
  
Frac(Latin American Immigrant) 0.034 (0.056) 
  
Frac(Mexican Immigrant) 0.023 (0.047) 
Frac(Cuban Immigrant) 0.006 (0.028) 
Frac(Other Hispanic Immigrant) 0.009 (0.023) 
Frac(Asian Immigrant) 0.016 (0.024) 
Frac(White Immigrant) 0.022 (0.018) 
Frac(Black Immigrant) 0.004 (0.010) 
Frac(Other Immigrant) 0.002 (0.004) 
  
Frac(High School Dropout Immigrant) 0.025 (0.036) 
Frac(High School Graduate Immigrant) 0.018 (0.024) 
Frac(Some College Immigrant) 0.014 (0.019) 
Frac(College Graduate Immigrant) 0.018 (0.022) 
  
Frac(Fluent in English) 0.066 (0.069) 
Frac(Not Fluent in English) 0.022 (0.033) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS  
Note: The fraction of immigrants with the above characteristics 
by MSA is averaged over the 119 MSAs used in this analysis. 
Language variables differ from the others in this table in that 
they sum to the fraction immigrant averaged over 1980-2000, 
which is 0.088 (0.098) 
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Table 3-3:  Immigrant Concentration Effects, by Language and Ethnicity 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
 Concentration Measure Estimate (SE) 
Panel 1: 
Model (3) Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.271*** (0.011) 
   
Panel 2a: 
Model (4) Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.200*** (0.010) 
   
Panel 2b: 
Model (4) Frac(I)*Native 0.430*** (0.009) 
   
Panel 3: 
Model (3) Frac(I)*Immigrant Fluent in English -0.129*** (0.011) 
by Language Frac(I)*Immigrant not Fluent in English -0.593*** (0.0124) 
   
Panel 4: 
Model (3) Frac(I)*Latin American Immigrant -0.372*** (0.012) 
by Source 
Country Frac(I)*Non-Latin American Immigrant -0.182*** (0.012) 
   
Panel 5:  
Model (3) 
Frac(I | Latin American Immigrant)*Latin 
American Immigrant -0.321*** (0.021) 
By Language Frac(I | Latin American Immigrant)*Non-Latin American Immigrant -0.083*** (0.024) 
 Frac(I | Non-Latin American Immigrant)*Latin American Immigrant -0.432*** (0.024) 
 Frac(I | Non-Latin American Immigrant)*Non-Latin American Immigrant -0.255*** (0.019) 
   
Panel 6: 
Model (3) Frac(I)*Mexican Immigrant -0.335*** (0.013) 
By Ethnicity Frac(I)*Cuban Immigrant -0.209*** (0.019) 
 Frac(I)*Other Hispanic Immigrant -0.419*** (0.013) 
 Frac(I)*Asian Immigrant -0.325*** (0.014) 
 Frac(I)*White Immigrant 0.358*** (0.015) 
 Frac(I)*Black Immigrant -0.510*** (0.019) 
 Frac(I)*Other Immigrant -0.417*** (0.030) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: all regressions estimated from 2,402,986 observations except for Panel 3 which is 
estimated from 2,200,671 observations (since uses only 1980-2000).  Standard errors in 




Table 3-4:  Immigrant Concentration Effects, by Education 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
 Concentration Measure Estimate (SE) 
Panel 1: 
Model (3)  Frac(I)*Immigrant High School Dropout -0.224*** (0.013) 
by 
Education Frac(I)*Immigrant High School Graduate -0.419*** (0.013) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant Some College -0.270*** (0.014) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant College Graduate -0.156*** (0.014) 
   
Panel 2: 
Model (3)  
Frac(I)*Immigrant in Professional or Technical 
Occupation 0.002 (0.014) 
by 
Occupation Frac(I)*Immigrant in Farming (non-labor) Occupation -0.261 (0.231) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Managerial or Office Occupation -0.213*** (0.016) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Clerical Occupation -0.298*** (0.017) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Sales Occupation -0.365*** (0.022) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Craftsman Occupation -0.469*** (0.014) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Operative Occupation -0.508*** (0.014) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Service Occupation -0.210*** (0.015) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Farm Laborer Occupation 0.525*** (0.048) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Other Laborer Occupation -0.116*** (0.018) 
   
Panel 3: 
Model (3)  Frac(I)*Immigrant in Agriculture 0.020  (0.030) 
by 
Industry Frac(I)*Immigrant in Mining 0.062 (0.114) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Construction -0.382*** (0.017)  
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Manufacturing -0.540*** (0.014) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Transportation and Communication -0.427*** (0.018) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.311*** (0.013) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in FIRE -0.122*** (0.020) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Business and Repair Services -0.218*** (0.017) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Personal Services -0.039 (0.029) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Entertainment and Recreation 0.105*** (0.035) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Professional and Related Services -0.064*** (0.017) 
 Frac(I)*Immigrant in Public Administration -0.236*** (0.027) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS.   Note: all regressions estimated from 2,402,986 observations. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All include fixed effects for education, age, age*education, 
year*MSA, year*cohort. 
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Table 3-5:  Specification Tests on Immigrant Concentration 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
 Specification of Concentration Estimate (SE) 
Panel 1: Model (3) Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.2712*** (0.0108) 
Panel 2: Model (3) by Year y1970*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.122* (0.0733) 
 y1980*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.1722*** (0.0315) 
 y1990*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.2436*** (0.0182) 
 y2000*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.3195*** (0.0151) 
Panel 3: Model (3) in Logs log(Frac(I))*I -0.0435*** (0.0018) 
Panel 3b: Model (3) in Logs y1970*log(Frac(I))*Immigrant -0.0053 (0.0059) 
by Year y1980*log(Frac(I))*Immigrant -0.0204*** (0.0039) 
 y1990*log(Frac(I))*Immigrant -0.0440*** (0.0030) 
 y2000*log(Frac(I))*Immigrant -0.0686*** (0.0031) 
Panel 4: Model (3) Quadratic Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.45 (0.04) 
 Frac(I)^2 * Immigrant 0.34 (0.07) 
Panel 4b: Model (3) Quadratic y1970*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.28 (0.08) 
by Year y1980*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.41 (0.04) 
 y1990*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.58 (0.04) 
 y2000*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.69 (0.05) 
 Frac(I)^2 * Immigrant 0.66 (0.08) 
Panel 5: Model (3) 1(0-10 pctl of Frac(I)) Dropped 
Non-Parametric 1(10-20 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.0609* (0.0340) 
 1(20-30 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.0765** (0.0322) 
 1(30-40 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.0765** (0.0318) 
 1(40-50 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.1110*** (0.0313) 
 1(50-60 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.1245*** (0.0307) 
 1(60-70 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.0786*** (0.0304) 
 1(70-80 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.1042*** (0.0303) 
 1(80-90 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.1208*** (0.0301) 
 1(90-100 pctl of Frac(I)) -0.1740*** (0.0301) 
Panel 6: Model (3) with MSAs 
in Common Support Every 
Year 
Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.0774 (0.280) 
Y1970*Frac(I)*Immigrant 1.5789** (0.7240) Panel 6b: Model (3) with MSAs 
in Common Support Y1980*Frac(I)*Immigrant 2.5266*** (0.870) 
Every Year, by Year Y1990*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.4761 (0.8320) 
 Y2000*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.8197** (0.3510) 
Panel 7: MSAs when in 
Common Support Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.5761*** (0.1083) 
Y1970*Frac(I)*Immigrant 0.2368 (0.2150) Panel 7b: Model (3) with MSAs 
when in Common Support, Y1980*Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.5160** (0.2095) 
by Year Y1990*Frac(I)*Immigrant -1.0484*** (0.2298) 
 Y2000*Frac(I)*Immigrant -1.0306*** (0.2130) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS.  Note: Panels 1-5 regressions estimated from 2,402,986 observations. 




Table 3-6:  MSAs in the Common Support of Fraction Immigrant 
 
1970-2000 1970 Common Support 1980 Common Support 
Akron, OH Bakersfield, CA Albuquerque, NM 
Albany-Schenectady, NY Bergen-Passaic, NJ Allentown-Bethlehem, PA/NJ 
Baltimore, MD Binghamton, NY Atlanta, GA 
Brockton, MA Boston, MA Austin, TX 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL Bakersfield, CA 
Cleveland, OH Denver-Boulder-Longmont, CO Baton Rouge, LA 
Corpus Christi, TX Flint, MI Beaumont-Port Arthur,TX 
Detroit, MI Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL Boston, MA 
Gary-Hammond, IN Fresno, CA Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 
Madison, WI Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT Denver-Boulder-Longmont, CO 
Milwaukee, WI Honolulu, HI Des Moines, IA 
New Haven-Meriden, CT Houston-Brazoria, TX Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL 
New Orleans, LA Las Vegas, NV Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT 
Philadelphia, PA/NJ Nassau Co, NY Houston-Brazoria, TX 
Rochester, NY Newark, NJ Las Vegas, NV 
Rockford, IL Omaha, NE/IA Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT Orlando, FL Nassau Co, NY 
Spokane, WA Phoenix, AZ Norfolk-VA Beach, VA 
Springfield-Holyoke, MA Portland-Vancouver, OR Omaha, NE/IA 
Syracuse, NY Providence-Fall River, MA/RI Orlando, FL 
Tacoma, WA Riverside-San Bernadino, CA Phoenix, AZ 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL Sacramento, CA Portland-Vancouver, OR 
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey, CA Providence-Fall River, MA/RI 
 San Antonio, TX Reading, PA 
 San Diego, CA Riverside-San Bernadino, CA 
 San Francisco-Oakland, CA Sacramento, CA 
 San Jose, CA San Antonio, TX 
 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA 
 Seattle-Everett, WA Seattle-Everett, WA 
 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN Stockton, CA 
 Stockton, CA Trenton, NJ 
 Trenton, NJ Tucson, AZ 
 Tucson, AZ Washington, DC/MD/VA 
 Utica-Rome, NY W.Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 
 Ventura-Oxnard, CA Wichita, KS 
 Washington, DC/MD/VA Worcester, MA 
 W.Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 
 Worcester, MA  
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Continued on next page 
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  Table 3-6 continued 
 
1990 Common Support 2000 Common Support 
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque, NM 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA/NJ 
Atlanta, GA Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 
Austin, TX Baton Rouge, LA 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange,TX Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange,TX 
Binghamton, NY Binghamton, NY 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, SC Birmingham, AL 
Chattanooga, TN/GA Charleston-N.Charleston,SC 
Denver-Boulder-Longmont, CO Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, SC 
Des Moines, IA Chattanooga, TN/GA 
Fort Wayne, IN Cincinnati OH/KY/IN 
Grand Rapids, MI Columbia, SC 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC Columbus, OH 
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton, CT Davenport, IA Rock Island-Moline, IL 
Jacksonville, FL Dayton-Springfield, OH 
Lancaster, PA Des Moines, IA 
Las Vegas, NV Erie, PA 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN Flint, MI 
Norfolk-VA Beach, VA Fort Wayne, IN 
Oklahoma City, OK Grand Rapids, MI 
Orlando, FL Greensboro-Winston Salem, NC 
Phoenix, AZ Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC 
Portland-Vancouver, OR Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 
Providence-Fall River, MA/RI Indianapolis, IN 
San Antonio, TX Jacksonville, FL 
Seattle-Everett, WA Kansas City, MO-KS 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN Knoxville, TN 
Toledo, OH/MI Lancaster, PA 
Trenton, NJ Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 
Tucson, AZ Louisville, KY/IN 
Tulsa, OK Memphis, TN/AR/MS 
Wichita, KS Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 
Worcester, MA Mobile, AL 
 Nashville, TN 
 Norfolk-VA Beach, VA 
 Oklahoma City, OK 
 Omaha, NE/IA 
 Peoria, IL 
 Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA 
 Reading, PA 
 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 
 Shreveport, LA South Bend, IN 
 St. Louis, MO-IL Toledo, OH/MI 
 Tulsa, OK Utica-Rome, NY 
 Wichita, KS    York, PA 
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 1970 1980 1990 2000 
80-20 differential of mean fraction of 
Immigrants… 
    
From Latin America 1.85 4.92 3.75 1.20 
High School Dropout 1.51 1.77 2.65 1.05 
High School Graduate 1.09 0.84 1.10 1.20 
Some College 0.70 1.33 1.38 0.91 
College Graduate 0.60 0.62 0.51 0.92 
Fluent in English - 0.91 0.81 0.88 
In Construction Industry 1.30 1.58 2.44 1.10 
In Manufacturing Industry 1.07 0.66 0.86 1.02 
In Personal Service Industry 1.55 2.41 1.67 1.25 
In Professional or Technical Occupation 0.56 0.66 0.61 0.88 
In Craftsmen Occupation 1.29 1.40 1.63 1.25 
In Service Occupation 1.49 1.22 1.33 1.54 
In Laborer Occupation 0.97 1.32 1.85 0.83 
     
90-10 differential     
From Latin America 2.94 3.70 6.92 1.65 
High School Dropout 2.13 2.27 3.83 5.27 
High School Graduate 1.20 0.83 1.36 0.57 
Some College 0.58 0.85 0.71 1.12 
College Graduate 0.49 0.63 0.54 0.82 
Fluent in English - 0.81 0.77 0.94 
In Construction Industry 2.03 1.49 2.20 1.99 
In Manufacturing Industry 1.00 1.23 0.85 0.89 
In Personal Service Industry 2.22 1.50 1.21 - 
In Professional or Technical Occupation 0.44 0.66 0.57 0.83 
In Craftsmen Occupation 1.33 1.20 1.19 1.02 
In Service Occupation 1.71 1.73 2.78 1.05 
In Laborer Occupation 1.68 1.81 2.06 10.02 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Table 3-8: Immigrant Concentration Effects, Including Employment Measures 
 
Including Zero Earners, Self-Employed and Unemployed 
 Concentration Measure Estimate (SE) 
(1) Dependent Variable: Log 
Weekly Wage Frac(I)*Immigrant -0.183*** (0.070) 
   
(2) Dependent Variable: 
1=employed, 0=unemployed Frac(I)*Immigrant 0.027*** (0.003) 
   
(3) Dependent Variable: 
1=positive earnings last year,  
0=0 earnings last year 
Frac(I)*Immigrant 0.0015 (0.0004) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: All regressions are estimated from 2,769,235 observations, using the linear 
probability model.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All include fixed effects for 










Table 3-9: Wage Growth Decomposition 
 
Panel 1 - Decompositions from Model (2) 




























































































            
Panel 2 - Decompositions from Model (3) 




























































































*in 1970, immigrants arriving 10-20 years earlier (1950-1959) cannot be broken down any further.  So wage growth for this cohort is calculated as the 
difference between the 1950-1950 cohort and the average of the 1960-64 and 1965-69 cohorts, following Borjas (1985). 
**Time in U.S. rather than cohort c is listed for parsimony.  In 1980, "<5 yrs" corresponds to cohort 1975-79 whereas in 1990 "< 5 yrs" corresponds to the 
cohort 1985-1989 and in 2000 “<5 yrs” corresponds to the cohort 1995-1999 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 




















































































































Number (Millions) Percent Number Latin American (Millions)
 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS.  Note: Sample is composted of men, Age 18-55, in the  Labor Force, Not Self-Employed or in the Military 
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Figures 1-4 to 1-6:  Growth and Dispersion of Immigrants over 1970-2000, by MSA 
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS.  Note: each observation plotted above represents one of the 119 major MSAs used in this study.  The fraction 
immigrant in each MSA-year is calculated as the number of immigrants over the number of immigrants plus natives (all weighted).  The line in the 
above plots is a 45-degree line for reference.
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS. Note: 1965 statistics are from 1970 forecasting the population backward using “state of residence 5 years ago”.  Each 
point represents the xth percentile of the distribution of fraction immigrant in given year.
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS.  Note: 1965 statistics are from 1970 Census forecasting the population backward using “state of residence 5 years ago”. Each point 
represents the average fraction immigrant for MSAs that fall in the x-yth percentiles of the distribution of fraction immigrant in 1965. 
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS. Note: 1965 statistics are calculated from the 1970 Census using the “state of residence 5 years ago” 
variable.  Each point represents the average fraction immigrant from Latin America for MSAs that fall in the x-yth percentiles of the 
distribution of fraction immigrant in 1965.  Latin American immigrants are defined as those born in Central or South America. 
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Figures 1-10 and 1-11: Wages of Native-born and Immigrants, by Education 
 












































































Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Source: Canadian Census PUMF 
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Figure 2-2: Change in Wages of Native-born vs. Change in Immigrant Share 
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Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Source: 2000 U. S. Census PUMS, 1986-2001 CPS (June and March Supplements), and 1984-1996 SIPP.  Note: Wage series includes immigrants and native-
born high school dropouts.
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Appendix A: MSAs Used in Analysis,  
Average Wage and Fraction Immigrant, 1970-2000 
 
Average Log Weekly Wage of 
Native Workers (1999 dollars) 
Fraction of Workers that are 
Immigrant MSA 
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Akron, OH 6.66 6.57 6.43 6.44 0.036 0.027 0.029 0.035 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 6.63 6.47 6.51 6.46 0.034 0.033 0.038 0.054 
Albuquerque, NM 6.48 6.36 6.31 6.31 0.024 0.043 0.066 0.100 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, 
PA/NJ 
6.60 6.57 6.52 6.47 0.024 0.035 0.042 0.062 
Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI 6.58 6.51 6.47 6.44 0.017 0.022 0.013 0.031 
Atlanta, GA 6.55 6.48 6.52 6.58 0.009 0.026 0.048 0.150 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 6.45 6.26 6.46 6.34 0.005 0.014 0.035 0.032 
Austin, TX 6.26 6.34 6.32 6.49 0.017 0.046 0.098 0.177 
Bakersfield, CA 6.51 6.48 6.48 6.38 0.051 0.095 0.181 0.260 
Baltimore, MD 6.55 6.49 6.54 6.54 0.028 0.032 0.042 0.070 
Baton Rouge, LA 6.52 6.55 6.40 6.36 0.020 0.025 0.017 0.042 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange,TX 6.49 6.70 6.46 6.36 0.012 0.028 0.034 0.066 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 6.77 6.49 6.75 6.77 0.099 0.077 0.226 0.318 
Binghamton, NY 6.57 6.42 6.45 6.28 0.028 0.024 0.027 0.042 
Birmingham, AL 6.43 6.42 6.41 6.45 0.003 0.011 0.007 0.038 
Boston, MA 6.64 6.50 6.66 6.72 0.071 0.090 0.133 0.182 
Brockton, MA 6.64 6.42 6.58 6.58 0.040 0.031 0.086 0.111 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 6.63 6.47 6.39 6.38 0.044 0.055 0.036 0.041 
Canton, OH 6.64 6.58 6.38 6.38 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.014 
Charleston-N.Charleston,SC 6.35 6.30 6.31 6.31 0.010 0.024 0.024 0.058 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, SC 6.45 6.35 6.39 6.52 0.012 0.021 0.026 0.104 
Chattanooga, TN/GA 6.43 6.44 6.33 6.35 0.004 0.009 0.029 0.037 
Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL 6.71 6.64 6.57 6.64 0.085 0.032 0.186 0.233 
Cincinnati OH/KY/IN 6.58 6.54 6.45 6.49 0.013 0.024 0.020 0.038 
Cleveland, OH 6.68 6.58 6.49 6.47 0.061 0.056 0.055 0.052 
Columbia, SC 6.37 6.30 6.37 6.37 0.004 0.017 0.018 0.049 
Columbus, OH 6.57 6.46 6.41 6.46 0.012 0.019 0.022 0.066 
Corpus Christi, TX 6.37 6.38 6.24 6.34 0.030 0.060 0.040 0.053 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 6.52 6.51 6.50 6.61 0.023 0.059 0.132 0.244 
Davenport, IA Rock Island-Moline, 
IL 
6.62 6.67 6.43 6.33 0.019 0.024 0.014 0.057 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 6.68 6.53 6.46 6.42 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.029 
Denver-Boulder-Longmont, CO 6.61 6.57 6.47 6.55 0.031 0.047 0.059 0.138 
Des Moines, IA 6.60 6.52 6.36 6.47 0.020 0.033 0.030 0.061 
Detroit, MI 6.75 6.70 6.58 6.61 0.059 0.058 0.052 0.088 
Duluth-Superior, MN/WI 6.52 6.57 6.33 6.32 0.023 0.019 0.012 0.012 
El Paso, TX 6.33 6.27 6.15 6.15 0.172 0.218 0.268 0.303 
Erie, PA 6.56 6.47 6.30 6.29 0.016 0.015 0.005 0.031 
Flint, MI 6.72 6.69 6.42 6.30 0.032 0.008 0.013 0.025 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 6.54 6.46 6.47 6.51 0.049 0.080 0.178 0.305 
Fort Wayne, IN 6.62 6.49 6.46 6.42 0.022 0.017 0.029 0.046 
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Appendix A Continued  
 
Average Log Weekly Wage of 
Native Workers (1999 dollars) 
Fraction of Workers that are 
Immigrant MSA 
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Fresno, CA 6.51 6.42 6.38 6.26 0.073 0.126 0.221 0.303 
Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, IN 6.70 6.73 6.52 6.49 0.049 0.052 0.042 0.062 
Grand Rapids, MI 6.59 6.52 6.51 6.48 0.018 0.024 0.028 0.072 
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High 
Point, NC 
6.38 6.34 6.35 6.39 0.003 0.016 0.014 0.086 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson 
SC 
6.37 6.33 6.35 6.40 0.011 0.019 0.027 0.055 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 6.55 6.44 6.43 6.43 0.012 0.020 0.016 0.036 
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton-New 
Britain, CT 
6.66 6.57 6.65 6.60 0.098 0.084 0.099 0.152 
Honolulu, HI 6.56 6.44 6.51 6.38 0.076 0.124 0.156 0.194 
Houston-Brazoria, TX 6.57 6.65 6.51 6.56 0.030 0.111 0.193 0.276 
Indianapolis, IN 6.62 6.54 6.46 6.50 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.050 
Jackson, MS 6.33 6.36 6.25 6.34 0.005 0.015 0.012 0.019 
Jacksonville, FL 6.43 6.43 6.36 6.39 0.020 0.022 0.044 0.059 
Jersey City, NJ 6.54 6.37 6.55 6.52 0.169 0.279 0.387 0.467 
Johnstown, PA 6.46 6.52 6.23 6.22 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.009 
Kansas City, MO-KS 6.59 6.54 6.45 6.51 0.015 0.022 0.023 0.063 
Knoxville, TN 6.45 6.39 6.28 6.31 0.003 0.020 0.016 0.026 
Lancaster, PA 6.48 6.47 6.54 6.45 0.014 0.024 0.027 0.041 
Las Vegas, NV 6.68 6.49 6.44 6.46 0.031 0.089 0.110 0.219 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 6.37 6.38 6.25 6.33 0.004 0.013 0.005 0.035 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 6.66 6.54 6.61 6.50 0.122 0.272 0.427 0.465 
Louisville, KY/IN 6.54 6.47 6.34 6.38 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.041 
Madison, WI 6.53 6.44 6.27 6.43 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.074 
Memphis, TN/AR/MS 6.40 6.39 6.35 6.40 0.009 0.008 0.014 0.059 
Miami-Hialeah, FL 6.51 6.43 6.40 6.34 0.266 0.412 0.522 0.603 
Milwaukee, WI 6.67 6.58 6.46 6.51 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.068 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 6.67 6.59 6.53 6.60 0.019 0.029 0.036 0.084 
Mobile, AL 6.34 6.37 6.33 6.32 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.029 
Nashville, TN 6.45 6.41 6.39 6.44 0.008 0.014 0.021 0.073 
Nassau Co, NY 6.81 6.64 6.78 6.76 0.083 0.076 0.116 0.181 
New Haven-Meriden, CT 6.60 6.47 6.66 6.56 0.074 0.074 0.057 0.106 
New Orleans, LA 6.42 6.50 6.33 6.30 0.029 0.044 0.045 0.067 
New York-Northeastern NJ 6.56 6.49 6.64 6.63 0.165 0.237 0.337 0.431 
Newark, NJ 6.71 6.60 6.72 6.75 0.088 0.137 0.189 0.251 
Norfolk-VA Beach-Newport News, 
VA 
6.44 6.40 6.41 6.32 0.006 0.026 0.033 0.046 
Oklahoma City, OK 6.48 6.45 6.34 6.29 0.013 0.023 0.039 0.090 
Omaha, NE/IA 6.59 6.48 6.36 6.44 0.027 0.035 0.013 0.072 
Orlando, FL 6.46 6.32 6.38 6.37 0.031 0.044 0.093 0.143 
Peoria, IL 6.66 6.69 6.49 6.44 0.008 0.025 0.021 0.027 
Philadelphia, PA/NJ 6.60 6.51 6.56 6.57 0.038 0.046 0.052 0.084 
Phoenix, AZ 6.49 6.46 6.43 6.48 0.032 0.056 0.092 0.184 
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA 6.62 6.60 6.43 6.40 0.021 0.024 0.017 0.027 
Portland-Vancouver, OR 6.63 6.54 6.45 6.52 0.032 0.052 0.064 0.139 
Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, 
MA/RI 
6.51 6.38 6.50 6.43 0.056 0.090 0.088 0.165 
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Appendix A Continued  
 
Average Log Weekly Wage of 
Native Workers (1999 dollars) 
Fraction of Workers that are 
Immigrant MSA 
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Reading, PA 6.51 6.51 6.53 6.47 0.014 0.026 0.022 0.044 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 6.49 6.46 6.48 6.48 0.012 0.019 0.023 0.059 
Riverside-San Bernadino, CA 6.56 6.51 6.56 6.44 0.066 0.086 0.200 0.265 
Rochester, NY 6.69 6.55 6.55 6.44 0.065 0.051 0.053 0.062 
Rockford, IL 6.64 6.64 6.43 6.50 0.026 0.026 0.049 0.089 
Sacramento, CA 6.64 6.49 6.48 6.48 0.057 0.066 0.118 0.158 
Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey, CA 6.52 6.49 6.45 6.45 0.109 0.220 0.331 0.419 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 6.54 6.47 6.35 6.40 0.040 0.025 0.048 0.109 
San Antonio, TX 6.32 6.28 6.26 6.27 0.042 0.086 0.104 0.137 
San Diego, CA 6.59 6.46 6.51 6.48 0.064 0.131 0.198 0.254 
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 6.71 6.60 6.66 6.80 0.116 0.167 0.318 0.348 
San Jose, CA 6.76 6.67 6.70 6.85 0.084 0.150 0.276 0.425 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, 
CA 
6.60 6.47 6.47 6.40 0.074 0.097 0.239 0.295 
Seattle-Everett, WA 6.72 6.65 6.57 6.63 0.050 0.063 0.085 0.154 
Shreveport, LA 6.40 6.35 6.30 6.25 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.027 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 6.56 6.47 6.45 6.42 0.025 0.021 0.031 0.063 
Spokane, WA 6.55 6.50 6.33 6.30 0.026 0.042 0.026 0.041 
Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, MA 6.56 6.40 6.46 6.39 0.063 0.046 0.058 0.082 
St. Louis, MO-IL 6.62 6.52 6.47 6.46 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.037 
Stockton, CA 6.61 6.47 6.46 6.46 0.081 0.106 0.172 0.276 
Syracuse, NY 6.61 6.48 6.44 6.39 0.031 0.041 0.030 0.041 
Tacoma, WA 6.58 6.58 6.42 6.48 0.032 0.039 0.046 0.079 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL 
6.41 6.33 6.33 6.37 0.033 0.047 0.069 0.112 
Toledo, OH/MI 6.63 6.58 6.43 6.40 0.014 0.021 0.029 0.034 
Trenton, NJ 6.66 6.53 6.67 6.73 0.065 0.068 0.097 0.194 
Tucson, AZ 6.51 6.36 6.21 6.27 0.056 0.067 0.095 0.140 
Tulsa, OK 6.53 6.51 6.40 6.39 0.012 0.012 0.026 0.069 
Utica-Rome, NY 6.57 6.32 6.32 6.28 0.040 0.022 0.024 0.045 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 6.67 6.64 6.71 6.64 0.099 0.155 0.237 0.275 
Washington, DC/MD/VA 6.71 6.64 6.70 6.71 0.050 0.087 0.162 0.225 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-
Delray Beach, FL 
6.48 6.44 6.49 6.53 0.055 0.086 0.141 0.241 
Wichita, KS 6.49 6.52 6.44 6.42 0.008 0.031 0.035 0.079 
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD 6.63 6.51 6.60 6.58 0.030 0.033 0.029 0.085 
Worcester, MA 6.58 6.47 6.61 6.54 0.059 0.042 0.057 0.131 
York, PA 6.53 6.50 6.52 6.46 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.031 
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 6.61 6.59 6.37 6.35 0.015 0.027 0.019 0.017 




Appendix B: Details on the Dispersion of Immigrants by MSA 
 The MSAs with the highest average fraction of immigrants over the period are 
shown below in Table B Panel A. 51  Unsurprisingly, the twenty MSAs with the highest 
average fraction of immigrants are all in California, Florida, Texas, Illinois, and the New 
York City area.  Most of these top MSAs also fall among those with highest average 
growth in the fraction of immigrants.  In large part, high fractions of immigrants are 
correlated with high growth in immigrant population (relative to native population).  This 
is evidence of the chain-migration theory of immigrant location choice.  However, that 
theory does not tell the whole story.  In the 1980s and 1990s, MSAs with historically low 
levels of immigrants began receiving more immigrants. 
 As Singer (2004) also shows, in the 1970s most new immigrants settled in MSAs 
that have traditionally received the majority of immigrants.  Over time, however, new 
immigrants began to settle in MSAs that traditionally had low ratios of immigrant to 
native population.  Over the 1980s and 1990s the number of immigrants in the U.S. grew 
rapidly, as did the dispersion of these new immigrants.  In the 1980s a new set of MSAs, 
which had very few immigrants in 1965, began to receive more; likewise in the 1990s 
another set of MSAs experienced new immigrant growth.  This variation in immigrant 
population across time and place is crucial to the identification of labor market effects of 
immigration on natives.   
 Table B Panel B shows the MSAs with the lowest average fraction of immigrants 
and the largest decreases in number of immigrants relative to natives.  As would be 
expected, most of these MSAs are in the Midwest, Rust Belt and Southeast.  In 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, the fraction of immigrants to natives varied from 0.3 to 1% 
between 1965 and 2000.  And in Jackson, Mississippi, the fraction varied between only 
0.5 and 1.9%.  These are in stark contrast to the high-immigrant areas such as Miami, 
Florida that varied between 19.7 and 60.3% immigrant and Jersey City, New Jersey that 
varied between 12.3 and 46.7%.  
                                                 
51 1960 data is not available at the MSA level.  I use the 1970 Census, and in particular the variable for place of 
residence 5 years earlier, to get an estimate of immigrant and native populations in 1965.   
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 The variation in fraction immigrant across MSA and across time was shown in 
Figures 1-7 and 1-8.  The variation across MSAs progresses with time.  The bulk of 
MSAs had very low fractions of immigrants in 1965; Miami, El Paso, New York City, 
and Jersey City are the exceptions.  These low levels changed very little between 1965 
and 1970, the period in which new immigration policy was enacted.  However, over the 
1970s, immigration began to grow.  These new immigrants continued to flock to the 
original high-immigrant areas of Miami, El Paso, and the New York City area.  But they 
also began settling in high numbers in California, Hawaii, and additional areas of Texas 
and the Northeast.     
 Similarly, in the 1980s another set of MSAs were affected by large influxes of 
new immigrants (relative to natives).  Some of the previously low-immigrant MSAs 
experiencing the largest growth in fraction immigrant over the 1980s were: Santa 
Barbara, California; Riverside, California; Yakima, Washington; Bakersfield, California; 
Ft Lauderdale, Florida; Stockton, California; Washington, DC; Vallejo, California; 
Middlesex, New Jersey; West Palm Beach, Florida; Reno, Nevada; Boston, 
Massachusetts; Dallas, Texas; and Norwalk and Danbury, Connecticut. 
 And again, another set of MSAs were affected in the 1990s.  These include: Las 
Vegas; Trenton, New Jersey; Santa Rosa, California; Salem, Oregon; Richland, 
Washington; Phoenix, Arizona; Austin, Texas; Providence, Rhode Island; Fort Worth, 
Texas; Waterbury, Connecticut; Seattle, Washington; Hartford, Connecticut; Atlanta, 
Georgia; Lowell, Massachusetts; Orlando, Florida; Tucson, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; 
and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina.    
 It is apparent from Figures 1-7 and 1-8 that both time and place are key 
components of the variation in fraction immigrant.  By 2000, most of the large MSAs in 
the U.S. experienced one or more decades of significant growth in immigrant population.  
Among the MSAs with the smallest fraction of immigrants by 2000 are: Billings, 
Montana; Sharon, Pennsylvania; Altoona, Pennsylvania; Johnstown, Pennsylvania; 
Monroe, Louisiana; Glens Falls, New York; Evansville, Indiana; Duluth, Minnesota; 
Decatur, Illinois; Terre Haute, Indiana; and Canton, Ohio.  
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Table B:  Fraction Immigrant by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
 
Fraction Immigrant MSA 
Panel A: Top 20  by Average Fraction Average 1965 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.451 0.197 0.266 0.412 0.522 0.603 
Jersey City, NJ 0.325 0.123 0.169 0.279 0.387 0.467 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.322 0.100 0.122 0.272 0.427 0.465 
New York-Northeastern NJ 0.293 0.138 0.165 0.237 0.337 0.431 
Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey, CA 0.270 0.089 0.109 0.220 0.331 0.419 
El Paso, TX 0.240 0.173 0.172 0.218 0.268 0.303 
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.237 0.102 0.116 0.167 0.318 0.348 
San Jose, CA 0.234 0.070 0.084 0.150 0.276 0.425 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 0.205 0.089 0.099 0.177 0.226 0.318 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.191 0.090 0.099 0.155 0.237 0.275 
Fresno, CA 0.181 0.069 0.073 0.126 0.221 0.303 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA 0.176 0.053 0.074 0.097 0.239 0.295 
Newark, NJ 0.166 0.069 0.088 0.137 0.189 0.251 
San Diego, CA 0.162 0.053 0.064 0.131 0.198 0.254 
Stockton, CA 0.159 0.085 0.081 0.106 0.172 0.276 
Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL 0.159 0.072 0.085 0.132 0.186 0.233 
Riverside-San Bernadino, CA 0.154 0.066 0.066 0.086 0.200 0.265 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 0.153 0.040 0.049 0.080 0.178 0.305 
Houston-Brazoria, TX 0.152 0.022 0.030 0.111 0.193 0.276 
Bakersfield, CA 0.147 0.046 0.051 0.095 0.181 0.260 
       
Fraction Immigrant MSA 
Panel B: Lowest 20 by Average 
Fraction Average 1965 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Johnstown, PA 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.009 
Jackson, MS 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.012 0.019 
Mobile, AL 0.014 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.029 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.005 0.035 
Birmingham, AL 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.007 0.038 
Shreveport, LA 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.027 
Canton, OH 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.014 
Knoxville, TN 0.016 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.016 0.026 
Louisville, KY/IN 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.041 
Erie, PA 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.005 0.031 
Duluth-Superior, MN/WI 0.017 0.027 0.023 0.019 0.012 0.012 
York, PA 0.018 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.031 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.019 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.029 
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA 0.019 0.026 0.015 0.027 0.019 0.017 
Chattanooga, TN/GA 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.029 0.037 
Flint, MI 0.020 0.028 0.032 0.008 0.013 0.025 
Peoria, IL 0.020 0.008 0.008 0.025 0.021 0.027 
Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.013 0.031 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 0.021 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.016 0.036 
Indianapolis, IN 0.021 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.050 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 0.022 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.035 0.032 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
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Appendix C: Issues in Data Comparability between the U.S. and Canada 
Both in replicating the Borjas analysis and in comparing U.S. and Canada Censuses, we 
had to make a number of judgment calls with the data.  These are outlined below. 
 
1) United States Censuses: 
a) Definition of Immigrant:  Individual is defined as an immigrant if: 
i) Born outside the U.S. and U.S. territories, and  
ii) Either: 
(1) Naturalized or Non-Citizen, or 
(2) Neither parent born in U.S. and U.S. territories (this applies to the 1970 
Form 2 only, where citizenship status is not available) 
2) Canadian Census: 
a) Reconciliation of Education Groups with the U.S.:  
 
 United States Canada 
High School Dropout Did not finish 12th Grade No degree or certificate 
High School Graduate Completed 12th Grade, including 
did or did not receive diploma 
and including GED 
Secondary/High School 
graduate certificate or 
equivalent 
Some College 1,2, or 3 years of college Trade certificate/diploma, 
other non-university 
certificate, or university 
certificate < B.A. 





degree, M.A., Ph.D.  
 
Both censuses have education definitions which vary over the period of analysis; 
some provide an individual’s highest degree attained, others provide the number 
of years of schooling, and some provide both.  The IPUMS data provides a 
variable which bridges these two and is comparable across years, and that is what 
is used above (“educrec” variable, and scheme suggested by Jaeger (1997)).  We 
attempt to construct a similar variable for the Canadian Censuses, both to make 
the education definition comparable across years and comparable with the U.S. 
definition.  One difficulty arises from differences in the countries’ education 
systems.  In the U.S. a high school education is completed in 12 years, and this is 
standard across the country.  However in Canada, high school may be considered 
complete in anywhere from 11 to 13 years depending on the province.   
 
b)  Wage topcoding:  Borjas adjusts the topcoded salaries in the U.S. between 1960 
and 1980    by multiplying the top values by 1.5 (which amounts to $25,000*1.5 in 
1960, $50,000*1.5 in 1970, and $75,000*1.5 in 1980).  These adjusted values are still 
lower than the top values in the Canadian census (after adjusting for the exchange 
rate), so we do not make a topcoding adjustment in Canada.  
 
c)   Exchange rate and inflation adjusting:  Following Borjas, we deflate U.S. dollars 
to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U series.  For Canadian dollars, we first adjust to U.S. 
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dollars using the Federal Reserve H.10 release and then convert to 1999 dollars again 
using the CPI-U.  
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Appendix D:  Year-Education-Experience Cell Sizes 
Raw # of US/Canadian Immigrants 
Education Years of Experience 1960 
(US) 
1970/1971 1980/1981 1990/1991 2000/1996 
HS 
Dropout 1-5 427 3484/593 10432/656 15323/692 21514/540 
 6-10 644 4405/773 11623/699 18551/1010 26015/676 
 11-15 845 5849/823 11025/882 18043/1283 25617/1045 
 16-20 1137 6818/948 9738/1099 16264/1317 23881/1226 
 21-25 1235 7381/1029 9347/1061 13549/1458 20468/1214 
 26-30 1577 7815/1034 8946/1233 10632/1521 17029/1345 
 31-35 2425 7747/845 8327/1268 8891/1515 13453/1278 
 36-40 3423 8384/575 8288/1368 7967/1676 9372/1276 
HS Grad 1-5 208 3326/87 7887/653 12720/1462 18317/1104 
 6-10 282 3591/141 7761/546 14148/1309 20004/1020 
 11-15 336 3667/129 7315/592 12607/1094 20057/1152 
 16-20 568 3335/118 5900/402 10603/1098 18607/1140 
 21-25 487 3425/132 5568/332 8770/1157 15530/998 
 26-30 559 4274/126 4778/227 7033/844 12396/1044 
 31-35 555 3213/95 4439/240 5871/595 9793/694 
 36-40 592 3577/87 4398/207 4807/448 6471/448 
Some 
College 1-5 153 2553/170 6477/626 10618/870 12273/755 
 6-10 233 2464/133 6684/1108 12257/1512 13774/1408 
 11-15 240 2132/124 5456/1447 11599/1829 14850/1799 
 16-20 290 1902/98 3890/1244 9647/2097 15033/1928 
 21-25 253 1764/95 3191/1171 7510/2265 12550/2168 
 26-30 234 1926/80 2557/1109 5446/1851 10027/2142 
 31-35 313 1375/44 2271/970 4169/1504 7025/1721 
 36-40 248 1406/41 1906/676 2941/1213 4420/1206 
College 
Grad 1-5 222 2971/253 5930/410 9031/866 14504/861 
 6-10 373 4447/219 10433/908 13848/1193 20755/1439 
 11-15 410 3766/199 9291/952 14600/1427 22973/1510 
 16-20 319 3385/162 8027/650 14447/1748 21117/1497 
 21-25 306 3103/148 5573/436 10879/1592 18250/1773 
 26-30 314 2148/109 4492/357 8706/1011 16185/1513 
 31-35 303 1996/49 3575/291 5535/674 10660/966 
 36-40 246 1743/47 2198/160 3891/436 7163/517 
Min  153 1375/41 1906/160 2941/436 6471/448 
Max  3423 7815/1034 11623/1447 18551/2265 25617/2168 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS and Canadian Census PUMF 
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Appendix E: Controlling for Education Selection 
 High school dropouts are the main identifying force in the fixed effects model of 
immigration and wages utilized in this paper and in Borjas (2003).  We exhibited why 
using decadal data on dropouts and wages may be misleading.  Here, we will show why 
failing to account for nation-wide trends in education may also lead to spurious 
conclusions about the effect of immigration on wages of U.S. workers.  First we will tell 
the story about changes in education over the period and second will present a method for 
controlling these trends in the immigration model.   
 Table E-1 shows the trend of increasing education among male workers in the 
U.S. over the 1960-2000 period.  Over half of native-born males age 18 to 64 in 1960 
were high school dropouts, but only about 12 percent were in 1990 and only 8.49 percent 
in 2000.  The percentage with some college education or a college degree nearly tripled 
between 1960 and 2000.  
 
Table E-1:  Distribution of Educational Attainment of U.S. Natives, 1960-2000 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
HS Dropout 51.28 36.66 21.98 11.81  8.49 
HS Grad 27.80 35.33 37.59 33.91 31.94 
Some College 10.00 12.90 18.81 28.69 30.94 
College Grad 10.92 15.11 21.62 25.58 28.63 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
 
 
If those workers “left behind” in the high school dropout category are actually of lower 
unobserved skill or ability, then using the same definition of education across the forty 
years of this study may lead to biased results.  Under the model that those remaining in 
the lowest educated category are negatively selected, and assuming that translates into 
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lower wages, the fixed effects regression presented earlier would tend to overestimate the 
negative effect of immigration on wages of natives.  Even in the absence of immigration, 
wages of native high school dropouts would be falling over the period due to the negative 
selectivity of high school dropouts.   
 We construct a counterfactual wage for high school dropouts in 1960-1990 
representing what the wage would have been if the most successful dropouts would have 
gotten a high school degree had they been of the same age in 2000.  We use the 
percentage of dropouts in each year to calculate a cutoff percentile as follows.  If 10% of 
men in 2000 are dropouts and 40% of men in 1960 are dropouts, then we estimate that 
one-quarter (10/40) of the dropouts in 1960 would have still been dropouts had they been 
of the same age in 2000.   Under the model that those with lowest wages among high 
school dropouts would have still been dropouts, the counterfactual wage is the average 
wage over the 1st to 25th percentile, in this example.    
 We construct this counterfactual wage for each year using the decennial Census 
data and the annual June CPS wage data.  Figure E-1 compares the actual trends in wages 
to the counterfactual, and we see that under the counterfactual model we assume, wages 



































































































This group, high school dropouts, controls the estimate of the correlation between 
immigration and wages and is thus extremely important.  Non-immigration related factors 
impact the wages of high school dropouts and must be considered.  Here, we have shown 
that negative selectivity of high school dropouts has a striking effect on the wages of this 
group.  Once accounted for, the trend in native wages earlier attributed to immigration 
has disappeared.  Education is a key identifying factor in the effect of immigration on 
wages and thus trends in education of natives cannot be ignored without risking making 
spurious conclusions.  This increasing negative selectivity should be considered as an 
alternative explanation of the observed negative correlation between immigration and 
wages within skill groups.   
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Appendix F: Testing National Labor Market Predictions 
 One of the key insights in Borjas (2003) was to estimate immigration effects on 
the national labor market, avoiding biases from migration that arbitrages wages.  If the 
U.S. labor market is truly national, and immigration impacts the market as expected by 
theory, then there are several predictions that we can test in the U.S. market.  First, no 
matter where an immigrant arrives in the U.S., if the national labor market presumption is 
correct, the effect on native-born wages should be the same in all regions of the U.S.  
Second, in any given area of the country, under a national labor market hypothesis, the 
wage in each region should be a function of immigration shocks in all other regions.  We 
proceed by analyzing these predictions in turn.  
 If a surge of immigrants arrive in New York City and the labor market is truly 
national, this supply shock should affect the national wage the same as if a surge of 
immigrants arrived in Ohio, for example.  To test this prediction, we decompose the 
national immigrant shock into regional shocks in the following way:  










= ∗ ≡ ∗
+∑ ∑                                       (F.1) 




+= + scales the regional 
immigrant shock by population.  We use five U.S. regions, defined roughly by the 
Census.52  There is a lot of variation in  ijtrX  across regions and across time, as Table F-1 
shows.   
 
 
                                                 
52 Region 1: New England (CT, ME, NH, RI, VT) and NJ, NY.  Region 2: Rust Belt (PA, OH, IN, and MI) 
with East North Central states (IL, IN, and WI).  Region 3: West North Central Region (IA, KS, MN, MO, 
NE , ND, SD).  Region 4: The South (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, 
LA, OK, TX).  Region 5: The West (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY, AK, CA, HI, OR, WA). 
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Table F-1: Immigrant Share by Region, 1960-2000 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
NY/NJ/New England  11.13% 9.40 11.80  15.12 20.06 
Rust Belt 4.65 3.93  4.24    4.99   7.46 
West Central 1.81 1.45  1.74    2.19   4.80 
South 1.72 2.27  4.24   7.08 11.63 
West 7.14 7.61 11.90 19.08 23.30 
National 5.20 4.75  6.82 10.24 14.19 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
 
The share of immigrants is increasing in most periods for most regions, but is increasing 
much more quickly in the South and West regions across the period.  The Northeast and 
West have the highest proportions of immigrants to all residents in all years.  As 
described above, if the national labor market hypothesis holds, the fact that immigrant 
share is increasing faster in the South than in the West Central region should not affect 
the impact immigrants to both these areas have on the national wage.  To test this, we 
estimate the model 
                        
5
1
ijt i j t i j i t j t ijtr ijtr ijtr
r
Y X s x s x s xβ γ π π π ϕ
=
= + + + + + + +∑                       (F.2) 
Note that the left-hand-side variable is the national wage with skill group ijt rather than 
the region wage.  So equation F.2 relates regional immigrant shares to the overall U.S. 
wage within education-experience groups over time (hence the model has 160 
observations).  The prediction from the national labor market hypothesis is 







Table F-2:   Testing National Labor Market Prediction 1 
 
Dependent Variable: ijtX  Estimate 
1̂β  (NY/Northeast) 
-2.292*** 
(0.808) 
2β̂  (Rust Belt) 
3.271 
(2.299) 









Note: standard errors in parentheses, regression is 
weighted by population in cell 
 
Equality of the coefficients is rejected with a Wald test F-statistic of 3.54 (with p-value of 
0.0103) on the weighted regression. 
 The second prediction we test is that if there is a national labor market, then 
wages in any region should be a function, in part, of immigrant shocks in all regions.  As 
above, we will use regional immigration shares on the right-hand-side but instead of the 
national wage, we use regional wage on the left: 
                 
5
1
ijtr i j t i j i t j t ijtr ijtr ijtr
r
Y X s x s x s xβ γ π π π ϕ
=
= + + + + + + +∑                 (F.3)                                 
This equation relates regional wage to all five regional immigrant shocks, within 
education-experience groups over time (hence there are 800 cells: 4 education, 8 
experience, 5 year, 5 region cells).  The national labor market hypothesis predicts that the 









Table F-3:  Testing National Labor Market Prediction 2 
 
Dependent variable: ijtrX  Unweighted Weighted 

























Note: standard errors in parentheses, regression is weighted by population in 
cell. 
 
Rather than finding that immigration shares in all regions are important in determining 
wages across the country, we find that only the coefficient on the West’s share is 
statistically significant. 
 These results lead us to believe that the hypothesis of a national labor market is 
not on the mark.  If wages within skill groups on a national level are affected by 
immigration, then they should relate equally to immigrant shocks in different areas of the 
U.S.  However, we find that the immigrant shares across regions have very different 
correlations (or none) with national wages.  Likewise, we expect that wages anywhere are 
determined by wages everywhere if the U.S. is a truly national labor market.  But only 
the immigrant share in the West has a statistically significant impact on wages in all other 
regions, even though other areas of the country have experienced increasing shares of 
immigrants.     
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Appendix G: Additional Explanatory Variables in Chapter 3 Models (1) – (3) 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
VARIABLE Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
High School Grad 
Dummy (HSG) 
0.2482*** 0.0026) 0.2414*** (0.0026) 0.2411*** (0.0026) 
Some College 
Dummy (SCOL) 
0.164*** (0.0029) 0.1604*** (0.0028) 0.1597*** (0.0028) 
College Grad 
Dummy (COLG) 
0.5221*** (0.004) 0.5054*** (0.004) 0.5042*** (0.0039) 
Age 25-34 0.5669*** 0.0029) 0.5688*** (0.0029) 0.5689*** (0.0029) 
Age 35-44 0.7193*** 0.0029) 0.7192*** (0.0029) 0.7196*** (0.0029) 
Age 45-55 0.7781*** 0.0028) 0.7744*** (0.0028) 0.7747*** (0.0028) 
HSG * Age 25-34 -0.0526*** (0.0036) -0.053*** (0.0035) -0.0531*** (0.0035) 
HSG * Age35-44 -0.016*** (0.0036) -0.0153*** (0.0036) -0.0154*** (0.0036) 
HSG * Age45-55 -0.0029 (0.0036) -0.0005 (0.0036) -0.0005 (0.0036) 
SCOL*Age 25-34 0.1274*** (0.0038) 0.123*** (0.0037) 0.1229*** (0.0037) 
SCOL*Age 35-44 0.2316*** (0.0038) 0.2295*** (0.0038) 0.2293*** (0.0038) 
SCOL*Age 45-55 0.2514*** (0.0039) 0.2524*** (0.0039) 0.2525*** (0.0039) 
COLG*Age 25-34 0.0219*** (0.0047) 0.021*** (0.0046) 0.0206*** (0.0046) 
COLG *Age 35-44 0.2371*** (0.0047) 0.2379*** (0.0046) 0.2374*** (0.0046) 
COLG *Age 45-55 0.2663*** (0.0047) 0.2716*** (0.0047) 0.2716*** (0.0047) 
1970 Dummy 5.806*** (0.0023)   
1980 Dummy 5.71*** (0.0023)   
1990 Dummy  5.5888*** (0.0023)   
2000 Dummy 5.5382*** (0.0023)   
    
Year*MSA Effects NO YES YES 




YES YES YES 
Frac(I)*I NO NO YES 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS.  Note: standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix H: Immigrant Concentration Effects Within and Across Language 
Groups 
 
Table H-1:  Immigrant Concentration Effects, by Language 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
 Concentration Measure Estimate (SE) 
Panel 5:  
Model (3) 
Frac(I | Fluent in English)* Immigrant Fluent in 
English -0.151*** (0.027) 
By Language Frac(I | Fluent in English)* Immigrant not Fluent in English -0.091*** (0.061) 
 Frac(I | Not Fluent in English)* Immigrant Fluent in English -1.065*** (0.039) 
 Frac(I | Not Fluent in English)* Immigrant not Fluent in English 0.512*** (0.086) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: regression estimated from 2,200,671 observations.  Standard errors are in 






Appendix I: Immigrant Concentration Effects by Ethnicity 
 
Table I-1:  Immigrant Concentration Effects, by Ethnicity including Direct Effects 
of Ethnicity 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage of Immigrants 
Direct Effects of Ethnicity for Group: Estimate (SE) 
   Mexican -0.143*** (0.002) 
   Cuban -0.133*** (0.009) 
   Other Hispanic -0.169*** (0.002) 
   Asian -0.136*** (0.004) 
   White Dropped 
   Black -0.268*** (0.001) 
   Other -0.170*** (0.005) 
Immigrant Concentration Effects by Ethnicity:  
   Frac(I)*Mexican Immigrant -0.394*** (0.014) 
   Frac(I)*Cuban Immigrant -0.254*** (0.027) 
   Frac(I)*Other Hispanic Immigrant -0.393*** (0.014) 
   Frac(I)*Asian Immigrant -0.334*** (0.017) 
   Frac(I)*White Immigrant -0.122*** (0.016) 
   Frac(I)*Black Immigrant -0.162*** (0.019) 
   Frac(I)*Other Immigrant -0.356*** (0.033) 
Source: U.S. Census PUMS 
Note: regression estimated from 2,402,986 observations.  Standard errors 
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